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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the dramatic shift
(since 1974 and the passage of the Section 8 Rental Subsidy
Program) in the distribution of elderly versus family hous-
ing units that are financed through the Massachusetts Hous-
ing Finance Agency (MHFA); and to analyse the legislative
and economic forces that favor the construction of elderly
housing. This thesis does not examine the political pro-
cess in which many sponsors obtain an allocation of Sec-
tion 8 subsidies directly from Washington as an explanation
of why more elderly developments are being financed and
built. This is an element of potentially great signifi-
cance, but it is an area in which research beyond the scope
of this thesis would be required before definitive conclu-
sions could be reached.
The hypothesis states that the decline in the production
of family developments and the rise in elderly develop-
ments is due to numerous legislative and economic factors:,
1) The intent of Congress in formulating the Section 8
Program and relying upon it as the sole vehicle for current
housing subsidies was to shift greater risks and rewards
for deciding the character, type, and location of subsi-
dized housing onto the private sector. This represented
a major departure from the central decision-making philo-
sophy of previous federal subsidy programs, and forced
sponsors under the Section 8 Program into a position of
being much more discriminating in their housing invest-
ment decisions.
2) Elderly housing is usually developed at a higher
density and higher costs per square foot. Thus the likeli-
hood of having a higher replacement cost; a higher prospect
for long term capital gains; and allowing the BSPRA to
reduce the sponsor's actual cash equity--all work together
as positive reinforcements for sponsors to prefer elderly
housing.
3) From another economic standpoint, elderly develop-
ments are preferable since they have higher Fair Market
Rents to cover operation and debt service costs. Further-
more, the adaptive reuse of structures like schools, offices,
factories, and parking garages (which are eligible for the
quickest write-off of all), tend to have development options
limited solely to elderly occupants (because of the elevator
clause), and these sponsors are earning by far the highest
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profits through the sale of tax shelters.
4) The poor performance of family developments under
the Section 236 Program is another reason why fewer family
developments are being built. Sponsors, the MHFA, in-
vestors and local communities all recognize the inherent
higher risks, operating expenses, and rate of project
failure that was associated with family housing under
previous programs. As a result, sponsors of Section 8
housing are less likely to propose family developments
and MHFA is less likely to finance them; because, in the
absence of FHA mortgage insurance, both the MHFA and spon-
sors have their own money at risk in the event of a default.
The potential of community opposition--which is also more
likely to be associated with family developments and could
become the catalyst for a default--is another reason why
less family housing is being built.
5) Finally, MHFA's decision-makers and its institutional
constraints also have an impact on the type of subsidized
housing that is being financed and built. Their recogni-
tion that elderly housing is a safer investment and there-
fore, better serves their objective of being a major cata-
lyst for private investment and neighborhood revitalization
is a significant variable in explaining the shift. Data
exists to show that sponsors of elderly housing have a much
greater rate of success in gaining mortgage financing than
sponsors of family housing. But further research is needed
to fully appreciate the political process in which a sponsor
can obtain an allocation of Section 8 subsidies directly
from Washington as anexplanation of why more elderly proposals
are being financed.
MHFA financing and the various rent subsidy programs
were specifically chosen as the focus for this analysis be-
cause they are the only programs that have been operating in
Massachusetts consistently over the past ten years with an
established record of producing multi-unit developments from
which a dramatic shift in the type of development taking
place can be observed and documented.
Furthermore, the significance of this thesis comes as
a timely document for both federal and state policy-makers
who stand at a crossroad on the question of whether it is
politically necessary to restore the balance between family
and elderly housing production. Given current policies and
the continuing impact of inflation in both the public and
private sectors of the economy, the imbalance in favor of
elderly housing can only increase in the absence of delib-
erate policy alternatives. Such an absence portends a future
in which MHFA financed family housing as we know it will be-
come a thing of the past.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne Sagalyn
Title: Assistant Professor in the Department of Urban
Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
Along with an analysis of the dramatic shift in favor of
the construction of elderly housing, it is important to
understand some of the history of MHFA--its creation and
legislative mandate in 1966; the initial context; and how
policy makers in Massachusetts perceived the housing
problem.
Following the post-World War II baby boom of the 1940s
and 1950s, the urban renewal experience of the 1950s and
1960s, and the Civil Rights and "white flight" movements
which followed; both public and private interests began to
recognize that a serious need existed for government aid in
the development of low and moderate income housing. Federally
sponsored public housing in Massachusetts (although very
successful in the development of Veteran's Housing) was
not perceived as an adequate approach to the overall housing
problem. The most obvious reason why public housing was not
expected to solve the housing problem was because of its fis-
cal limitations. The government simply could not afford to
build and own enough of a housing stock to meet the housing
needs of everyone living in sub-standard housing whose in-
come was too low to afford anything better. Therefore,
housing planners and government officials felt compelled to
devise new programs with public subsidies and incentives
which could leverage larger amounts of private capital and
therefore go further towards the goal of producing an adequate
supply of safe and standard dwelling units for low-income
family and elderly households.
-10-
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MHFA's Legislative Mandate: A Public Purpose Lending
Institution
Out of this environment on September 8, 1966, the
Massachusetts Legislature passed Chapter 708, "An Act
Establishing the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency,"
whose public purpose was to promote the production of
decent, safe, standard housing--"which persons and fami-
lies of low income, elderly persons and veterans...can
afford."
MHFA's main purpose became that of a public purpose
lending institution and was put into operation in 1970
by $500,000,000 bonding authority backed by the full faith
and credit of the Commonwealth. The Agency used the author-
ity to issue tax-exempt bonds for sale to private
investors and then turn around and lend the revenues from
the bond sales at below market interest rates to sponsors
of low-moderate income housing. After this had occurred
several times and the developments were occupied and had
an ongoing operational cash flow; mortgage payments from
the sponsors would be returned to the Agency and reloaned.
Many times since then the MHFA has expanded its over-
all lending capacity by increasing its total bonding author-
ity by increments ranging from $200,000,000 to $4000,000.
The result of this has been to make MHFA one of the most
innovative, responsive, and productive State Housing Finance
1. Chapter 708, Section 2, Declaration of Public Necessity
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Agencies in the nation.1 The MHFA, by periodically increas-
ing its overall bonding capacity, has been able to utilize
numerous federal housing subsidy programs as they are en-
acted and therefore provide subsidized housing units which
would not have otherwise been provided. It is, therefore,
here that the analysis of the shift towards elderly housing
construction begins.
Housing Needs in Massachusetts
Since the Act creating the MHFA mandated as its pub-
lic purpose the production of housing for all kinds of
low and moderate income households, a determination of
housing needs by household type was an important first
step. This determination was first done in 1970 and
produced an estimate of housing needs by household type,
and it has been updated twice; once at the end of 1977
and again at the end of 1979.2
1. Development of State Housing Finance Agencies, 1977 PhD.
dissertation by Jim Wallace, M.I.T.
2. At the heart of the Housing Needs Study is a rather
simple housing requirements/housing inventory model for
both elderly and family units in every community in Mass-
achusetts. In addition to unit size requirements, house-
hold financial resources were incorporated. To estimate
supply, owner data was used to develop a rent-unit size
matrix with frequencies, and an effort was made to sub-
tract out substandard units from the eligible housing
stock. Once the community housing needs and housing
supply was established, a matching program was employed
to pair each household with an available unit at an
affordable price. The shortfall of affordable units in
this matching process is the community's-- and together
the Commonwealth's-- low-moderate income housing need.
(Mass. Department of Community Affairs, "Part I: A Review
of D.C.A.'s Needs Methodology", pp. 1,2, 1978)
-13-
Table 1
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS WHO QUALIFY
FOR RENTAL ASSISTANCE AND PUBLIC HOUSING (1970, 1978, and 1980)
Date Elderly* Family Total
As of Jan. 1, 1970 208,290 (44%) 260,249 (56%) 468,539 (100%)
As of Jan. 1, 1978 162,693 (46%) 187,264 (54%) 349,957 (100%)
As of Jan. 1, 1980 161,969 (47%) 184,370 (53%) 346,330 (100%)
*Elderly defined as over 62 years of age.
Source: E.O.C.D., Office of Policy, Planning, and Program
Development, Housing Needs in Massachusetts, 8 Oct-
ober 1980.
The distribution of housing needs in Massachusetts by
household type has changed in the last ten years toward a
higher percentage of elderly households in need; neverthe-
less, the basic picture of very nearly equal housing needs
between family and elderly households remains the same.
In light of this data, it is against the 1970 estimate
of housing needs by household type that the MHFA's elarliest
goals should have been set, and it is against the 1978 and
1980 estimates of' remaining needs that its more recent per-
formance will be evaluated.
The Housing Problem: Unequal Program Utilization
Numerous housing programs have been utilized by MHFA
sponsors over various years, but a look at the distribution
of units subsidized under each of the programs in Table 2
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below prior to Section 8 suggests that elderly and family
housing needs were being met at a very equivalent rate.
The Section 236 Interest Subsidy Program was by far
the most widely used program (13,825 units) by MHFA sponsors
prior to Section 8, and its distribution of benefits
did address both elderly and family housing needs propor-
tionally as defined' by then-current measures; i.e. 44 percent
elderly, and 56 percent family construction. This was de-
termined by compiling data from MHFA's Housing List on every
development and separating out the number of units designated
for the elderly from the total number of units and further
distinguishing elderly from family units by the type of sub-
sidy that was utilized. The result of this research revealed
that one half of the mixed E/F production consisted of
elderly units and one half consisted of family units.
Therefore, the Section 236 program benefitted 44 percent
elderly and 56 percent family households and statistically
matched the estimated distribution of housing needs in Mass-
achusetts. Very similar results occurred in the author's
analysis of the benefits of the Massachusetts Section 13A
Interest Subsidy Program; the federal Rent Supplement Program
(RSP); and the Massachusetts Chapter 707 Rent Subsidy Program.
The data in Table 2 and the analysis which follows has been
displayed in three categories, however, to conform with data
-15-
Table 2
SUBSIDY PROGRAMS USED WITH MHFA FINANCED UNITS
PRIOR TO SECTION 8: 1970-75
Number
of Units/
Elderly
1.0-1.29
Ave. BR*
Mixed E/F or
Small Family
1.3-1.89
Ave. BR
Large Family
1.9 & over
Ave. BR
Total #/
100%
Section 236 2,693 6,673 4,369 13,825
Federal
Int. Subsidy 19% 49% 32% 100%
Section 13A 1,802 4,009 963 6,774
Massachuse tts
Int. Subsidy 27% 59% 14% 100%
Federal 1,115 1,724 1,232 4,071
Rent
Supplements 27% 42% 31% 100%
Chapter 707 514 1,013 468 1,995
Massachusetts
Rent Subsidies 26% 51% 23% 100%
Federal 485 319 147 951
Section 23
Pre-Section 8 51% 34% 15% 100
Total 6,609 13,738 7,179 27,616
24% 50% 26% 100%
* Ave. BR means the average bedroom size per unit over the
entire development.
Source: Compiled by author from MHFA's Housing List; Feb. 1980
from HUD sources and to shed additional light on the true
character of subsidized developments. Clearly a great many
developments prior to Section 8 were not just for families or
the elderly. They mixed household types prior to Section 8,
but after Section 8 this occurred less often.
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The exception to this was the distribution of units by
household type which was utilized under the federal Section
23 Leased Housing Program. The Leased Housing Program had
just gotten underway the year before Section 8 was funded
(as evidenced by only 951 units developed through MHFA); and
following the Nixon Housing Moratorium, the Section 23
Program was not revived. Its concept of having tenants
pay 25 percent of their income on housing costs was so sim-
ilar to Section 8's guidelines that Congress made Section 8
1its sbme vehicle for additional housing subsidy committments.
As evidenced in Table 2 above, over 50 percent of Section
23 units with MHFA financing went to the benefit of all
elderly developments--not to mention another 17 percent
in mixed elderly/family developments. The reasons behind
this are that around this time (1972-1974) federal housing
policies were being revised under the leadership of the Nixon
Administration to shift more of the risks and rewards (site
control, site selection, occupancy type, design, density,
and professional expertise) for developing subsidized housing
onto the private sector2 . As this was accomplished through
the RSP and the Section 8 SR/NC Program, "a predominance
of units for elderly households" began to occur in the early
1970s. 3 This is evidenced by the fact that (unlike previous
programs) the Section 8 benefits are not being utilized
1. Arthur Solomon, "Federal Housing Policy: Background Paper
on Recurring Policy Issues," M.I.T.-Harvard Joint Center
for Urban Studies, unpublished paper, 1977, pg. 93.
2. U.S. Code Congressional, "Leased Housing Legislative
History," pg. 4303.
3. E.O.C.D. Housing Needs in Massachusetts as of Jan. 1, 1978,
Office of Planning, Policy and Program Development, pg. 4
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in a way that proportionally addresses the needs of both family
and elderly households--either in Massachusetts (see Table 3
below) nor across the nation (see Table 4 below). The imbal-
aice has occurred since the Section 8 benefits are being uti-
lized to meet the needs of elderly households proportionally
far more than the needs of small and large family households.1
And although housing subsidies are not being wasted on the
elderly,2 it is cause for concern that only 4 percent of the
MHFA financed Section 8 units from the beginning of the program
through February 1980 have been intended for occupancy by
large families and only 17 percent are mixed.
Table 3
DISTRIBUTION OF SECTION 8 UNITS THROUGH MHFA FINANCING
FROM JULY 1975 - FEBRUARY 1980
Number/ Elderly Mixed E/F or Large Family Total/
1.0-1.29 Small Family 1.9 & over
Ave. BR 1.3-1.89 Ave. BR
Ave. BR
Section 8 7,178/ 1,583/ 348/ 9,109/
79% 17% 4% 100%
Source: Compiled by the author from MHFA's Housing List.
1. Kirk McClure, "Review of Section 8 Fair Market Rents (FMR)
Published October 31, 1979: Estimated Impact on Project Feasi,
bility," Dated November 28, 1979, MHFA memo.
2. Irving Welfeld and Raymond J. Struyk, "Housing Options for the
Elderly," in Occasional Papers in Housing and Community Affairs,
vol. 3, Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Dept.
of HUD, 1978.
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Table 4
ELDERLY/FAMILY ORIENTATION OF NATIONALLY SAMPLED PROJECTS--1977
All Mixed All Total
Elderly E/F Families
Section 8
NC/SR 61% 16% 23% 100%
Program
Source: U.S. Dept. of HUD, Office of Policy Development and
Research, Lower Income Housing Assistance Program
(Section 8): Interim Findings of Evaluation Research,
an articlewithin by Gilmer Blakespoor and Susan
Jaffee, "The New Construction Program," p. 163.
Many reasons exist to explain why the Section 8 program
has been used so heavily for elderly as opposed to family
needd, and why this trend is likely to continue in the ab-
sence of deliberate policy alternatives; thus, it is the
purpose of this thesis to document the economic and legislative
forces that have led the MHFA and its sponsors into the
current situation.
PART I
THE IMPACT OF HOUSING SUBSIDY PROGRAMS ON
MHFA's HOUSING PRODUCTION PRIOR TO HUD's SECTION 8 (1970-1975)
CHAPTER I
THE EARLY YEARS
HUD's Section 236 Interest Subsidy Program
The major vehicle for federal assistance in the con-
struction of multi-family housing through MHFA was the
Section 236 program of the Housing Act of 1968. This pro-
gram was open to both profit and non-profit sponsors and
offered an interest subsidy that could reduce the interest
rate to as low as 1%. In Massachusetts, 19% of the Section
236 units were built especially for the elderly, and the same
was true nationally'. The Nixon Administration, however, put
a moratorium on new committments in January 1973 and thus set
the stage for his Administration and Congress to revise national
housing policies towards a new direction.
The Section 236 interest subsidy was sufficient to reduce
t.hant rental payments to an average of about 30% of family
income2 , and additional subsidies were occasionally provided
on behalf of the occupants of some of the units through Rent
Supplement Payments (RSP) specifically authorized for use in
conjunction with Section 236. Piggybacking of these subsidies,
which were paid to the project owner, permitted tenants' rents
for some units to be reduced to 25% of their income without
1. GAO Report to Congress, Section 236 Rental Housing: An
Evaluation with Lessons for the Future, January 1978, p.3
2. ibid.
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jeopardizing the financial viability of the projects.
The distribution of both Section 236 and Rent Supple-
ment units financed through the MHFA reflects this piggy-
backing kind of relationship , and it demonstrates an equal
responsiveness to the needs of both family and elderly house-
holds. Almost half, 49%, of its benefits went to mixed elder-
ly/family developments or small family developments , and
almost one third, 32%, went to large families (rather than to
the extreme of benefitting mostly elderly households).
Despite these multiple subsidies, however, Section 236
was plagued by high default rates. More than 14% of the approx-
imately 4,000 Section 236 mortgages written nationally through
1976 were assigned to HUD by the mortgagee or foreclosed by the
end of that year 2 . And, while the MHFA demonstrated a great
deal of courage and leadership in their attempt to formulate
"workout" solutions for their own troubled projects3, the
basic problems of an inadequate tenant selection process,
higher operating expenses than anticipated, and insufficient
cash flow due to vacancies and non-rent-paying tenants
.4all surfaced in Massachusetts as well as across the nation
1. See Table 2 above.
2. GAO Report to Congress, Section 236 Rental Housing: An Eval-
uation With Lessons for the Future, January 1978, pg. 19
3. For an indepth discussion of MHFA's "workout" strategies
see Warren Quin Seeto, "Distressed Subsidized Housing:
Effects, Preventions and Solutions," M.I.T. M.C.P. Thesis
1976
4. Chuck McSweeny, Massachusetts Executive Office of Commun-
ities and Development, interview, Boston, 19 May 1980.
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In suspending the program in 1973, the Nixon Adminis-
tration charged that the assistance was not great enough to
serve very low income people, the program was too expensive,
and default rates were unacceptably high1.
GAO's analysis of Section 236 mortgage faulures showed
however that;
Most Section 236 financial failures occurred in non-
profit and cooperatively sponsored projects rather
than profit-motivated ones. Roughly 58% of all fail-
ures were in non-profit and cooperatively sponsored
projects although they comprised only about 30% of
total insurance .
Table 5
NON-PROFIT AND COOPERATIVE SPONSORS
COMPRISE A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF FAILURES, JUNE 30, 1976
UNDER THE SECTION 236 PROGRAM
Type of Percent of Percent of
Sponsor Sponsored Project
Projects Failures
Non-Profit 23 47
Cooperative 6 11
Limited Dividend 71 42
Total 100% 100%
Source: Section 236 Rental Housing, pg. 14.
1. Arthur Solomon, "Federal Housing Policy: Background Paer
on RecurrinE Policy Issues," pg. 93.
2. GAO Report to Congress, Section 236 Rental Housing; An
Evaluation With Lessons for the Future, January 1978, pg.13.
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These failures very likely resulted from lack of exper-
ience and limited financial resources in the non-profit or
cooperatively sponsored projects which contributed to manage-
ment problems and made it difficult to meet unexpected expen-
ses during construction or operation.
The basic problem with the Section 236 interest subsidy
program was that the subsidy was inflexible. Since the sub-
sidy was a fixed interest subsidy locked in at the beginning
of the mortgage to reduce the finance charges down to 1%,
the subsidy could not rise to meet increased operating costs
brought on by inflation. Increases in operating costs were
therefore passed on to the tenants who had a very limited
ability to pay higher rents. Collection losses and operating
deficits occurred; and if the problem went on long enough, a
mortgage default was almost inevitable.
Suspending the program, however, did more than just pre-
vent many new commitments from being made. The mistakes in
tenant selection and management of these projects also had
a lasting and damaging impact for family developments in the
minds of the sponsors and investors who are depended upon for
resources that make the development process work.1 Soon after
the moratorium, sponsors of subsidized housing began to equate
non-elderly headed households with project failures, since
the Section 236 program had the highest percentage of non-
elderly headed households and an unacceptably high overall
rate of failure.
1. GAO Report, Evaluation of Alternative Methods for Financing
Low-Moderate Income Rental Housing, Sept. 1980, pg. iv.
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HUD's Rent Supplement Program (RSP) 1965-1973
The purpose of reviewing the RSP is that contained in
its development is the first sign that Congress and the Ad-
ministration were concerned about whether various housing
subsidy programs were being utilized to meet both elderly
and family housing needs. The Rent Supplement Act was pass-
ed in 1967 to provide payments to the owners of private ren-
tal housing on behalf of low-income tenants, but it was used
primarily to reduce rental charges in Section 236 and other
mortgage subsidy projects. Rent supplements paid the differ-
ence between 25% of the tenant's adjusted income and the Fair
Market Rent (FMR) and wereinitially available to no more than
20% of the units in a given project. Tenant eligibility
criteria required that the household income be low enough to
qualify for public housing; and they must fit into one of
the following categories: elderly, handicapped, displaced by
government action, victims of natural disasters, occupying
substandard housing, or headed by a person serving active
military duty.
While it has been said that the RSP program was used
primarily to piggyback Section 236 subsidies, an important
precedent occurred in 1972 in the RSP regulations which
was a reflection of both public and private dissatisfaction
with the overall thrust of federal housing subsidy programs.
At the heart of the dissatisfaction was the growing awareness
that many Section 236 developments were in financial diff-
iculty and that family tenants were more costly to manage.
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In response to this situation and with the effect of penal-
izing the victims in family developments, Congress
increased the ceiling from 20% to 60% (and would later in-
crease it to 100%) of the units in elderly occupied develop-
ments that could receive rent supplements by passing the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 19721.
The significance of this differential comes from the
fact that it encouraged developers to perceive family and
elderly developments differently in terms of their financial
stability and risk factors. With most if not all of the units
in an elderly development under a subsidy of one form or an-
other, the owner has less to be concerned about collection
losses and tenants being unable to pay. This same reasoning
is carried a step further in the analysis in Chapter 2 in
which it is argued; since family households tend to have high-
er incomes and their share of the rent is likely to be lar-
ger than for an average elderly household, sponsors prefer
developing elderly units since proportionally more of their
2
rental income comes from HUD on time each month. Evidence
that sponsors began to favor doing elderly developments
began to occur around 1972 and is suggested by the fact that
the distribution of RSP benefits began to shift in favor of
1. Jane Bloom, Assistant Secretary of HUD for Elderly Affairs,
"1972 is Shaping Up As a Big Year for the Elderly," Journal
of Housing, September 1972, pg. 402-407.
2. See Figure 13 below.
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more elderly units between the time Section 236 closed out
and immediately before passage of the Section 8 program
(See Table 6 below).
While this data is not conclusive evidence to argue
that MHFA sponsors would begin flocking in to do elderly
developments, it does suggest that doing housing for the
elderly would increase in populatity. Given the high rates
of project failures due to the inflexible interest subsidy un-
dr the Section 236 program , and a legislated differential
that translates into less risk and a project with a greater
share of its income guaranteed; one must acknowledge the
potential impact of higher subsidy limits for elderly devel-
opments over a more extended period of time.
1. GAO Report to Congress, Section 236 Rental Housing: An
Evaluation With Lessons for the Future, January 1978,
pg. 19.
-27-
Table 6
SUBSIDY PROGRAMS USED
WITH MHFA FINANCED UNITS PRIOR TO SECTION 8 (1971-1975)
Number Elderly Mixed E/F Large Total
and 1.0-1.29 or Small Family
Percentages Ave. BR* Family 1.3- 1.9 & over
1.89 Ave. BR* Ave. BR *
Section 236 2,693 6,673 4,369 13,825
Interest
Subsidies 19% 49% 32% 100%
Rent 1,115 1,724 1,232 4,071
Supplement
Program 27% 42% 31% 100%
Difference +8% -7% -1%
* Ave. BR means the average bedroom size per unit over the
entire development
Source: Compiled by the Author from MHFA's Housing List
HUD's Section 23 Leased Public Housing Program
Section 23 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 is another
housing subsidy program that MHFA sponsors used in the early
years of MHFA's history. The program is considered to be the
"godfather" of Section 8 which is HUD's current major hous-
ing assistance mechanism. Its aim was to encourage the con-
struction of low income housing units by providing assurances
that low income tenants would be assisted in making their
rent payments. When the program was announced on September
19,1973, it was to provide 200,000 subsidized housing units,
three quarters of which were expected to be new construction
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stimulated by the availability of RSP 1 . The results fell
far short of projections, however, as only 4,441 units
nationally were approved for leasing and over 36,000 appli-
cations remained unprocessed when the program was discon-
tinued to await Section 82 (yet it is a credit to MHFA's
readiness that Massachusetts received 951 of those approved
units). Of those 951 units, 51% benefitted elderly house-
holds 3 , and herein lies the significance of the Section 23
program in the framework of forces that favor the develop-
ment of elderly housing. It is that despite the relatively
small impact that Section 23 made on housing in Massachusetts,
it is interesting that so soon after the troubling experience
with Section 236 and low income families, the sponsors of
Section 23 units chose to build more than half of their units
for occupancy by elderly households.
While such a small sample is not conclusive evidence
that sponsors were reluctant to propose family housing as
early as 1973-1974, it is consistent with much more convin-
cing evidence that will follow.
1. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Pro-
grams of HUD, November 1978, pg. 33.
2. Arthur Solomon, "Federal Housing Policy: Background Paver
on Recurring Policy issues," pg. 95.
3. See Table 7 below.
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Massachusetts' Section 13A and Chapter 707 Enactments
Basically only two housing programs were enacted for
MHFA sponsors in Massachusetts, and while they were similar
to certain federal housing assistance programs, they enjoyed
a relatively quiet existence and ceased operation in 1976.
The reason they ceased operation is that they were no longer
needed in the face of growing Section 8 commitments. The
Massachusetts' Section 13A interest subsidy program, as en-
acted by Chapter 708 of the Acts of 1966, reduced the rent
on low and moderate income MHFA developments by subsidizing
the interest rate down to 1% just as did Section 236 of the
1968 U.S. Housing Act.1
In the same manner, Chapter 707 of the Massachusetts'
Acts of 1966 resembled Section 23 of the U.S. Housing Act
of 1937 and consisted of a rental assistance program for
both low income family and elderly households. Chapter 707
paid the difference between the published Department of
Community Affairs' rent schedules and 25% of the tenants'
2
adjusted income
Interest subsidies and rental assistance were piggy-
backed in these Massachusetts programs just as they were
on the federal level; however, no apparent differentials
were given that favored either elderly or family housing
1. Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities and Devel-
opment, Budget Projections and Needs for Existing State
Housing Assistance Programs, FY 1976-FY1980, Chapters 1,2.
2. ibid.
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sponsors. Neither do the data appear to have warranted
incentives that favored either family or elderly sponsors,
since the utilization patterns of both these programs seem
to fairly reflect the distribution of housing needs (com-
pare with Table 1 above).
Table 7
STATE SUBSIDY PROGRAMS USED WITH MHFA FINANCED UNITS: 1970-1976
Number Elderly Mixed E/F Large Total
and 1.0-1.29 or Small Family
Percentages Ave. BR* Family 1.3- 1.9 & over
1.89 Ave. BR* Ave. BR*
Section 13A 1,802 4,009 963 6,774
Interest
Subsidies 27% 59% 14% 100%
Ch. 707 514 1,013 468 1,995
Rent
Supplements 26% 51% 23% 100%
* Ave. BR means the average bedroom size
entire development.
per unit over the
Source: Compiled by the Author from MHFA's Housing List
The significance of these state subsidy programs is
also reflected in when they were most heavily utilized.
Prior to the Housing Moratorium in January 1973, these pro-
grams accounted for a small proportion of the subsidized units
that MHFA financed. Following the moratoruim, however, and
prior to the growth of Section 8 subsidies, these state pro-
grams were more heavily utilized to compensate for the loss
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of federal support (see Figure 1 below). Notice the in-
crease in 1974 subsidies over 1973, and their decline follow-
ing 1974 which corresponds to the time when federal subsidies
were being reinstated.
Figure 1
UTILIZATION OF SECTION 13A AND CHAPTER 707 PROGRAMS
Number
QL1500 Section 13A '
Units Chapter 707
1200
900
600
300
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
Year
Source: Compiled by the author from MHFA's Housing List
Thus taking the utilization pattern and the years in
which each program operated, it can not be demonstrated these
programs had any effect in producing the shift which favors
the development of elderly rather than family subsidized
housing.
-32-
CONCLUSIONS
Upon examining the history of MHFA and the distribu-
tion of their housing production from 1970-1975, it is con-
cluded that housing needs among family and elderly households
were being met at roughly similar rates under both state and
federal subsidy programs. Out of this activity, however,
emerged experiences and perceptions which would leave a stig-
ma in the minds of private developers about the risks and the
disadvantages of developing family housing. It was some-
thing that was mostly a perception or an inclination, how-
ever, until passage of the Section 8 Rental Assistance Program
which enabled private sponsors and developers to translate
their preferences and experience into a dramatic shift away
from family housing production.
The aspects of the Section 8 program and the economic
and investment incentives which combine to favor the devel-
opment of elderly housing will be analysed and evaluated
more fully in the following chapters.
Again, what this thesis does not examine is the polit-
ical process and the political nature of the elderly housing
issue. It is suggested, however, that one would find a bet-
ter organized and more powerful coalition in favor of elderly
housing, and thus greater political rewards for those who help
produce it; but such an analysis is not the subject of this
thesis.
PART II
THE IMPACT OF HUD'S GUIDELINES IN EFFECT FROM 1974-1980
ON MHFA'S HOUSING PRODUCTION
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CHAPTER II
HUD'S SECTION 8 OF THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974
The New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program (NC/SR)
The Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehab (NC/SR)
Program provides assistance on behalf of low-income households
occupying newly-built or significantly rehabbed units that
meet certain criteria as to cost, physical adequacy, and lo-
cation. Under these programs, public agencies or private
sponsors develop housing projects in which a portion of the
units are made available to low and moderate income renters at
reduced costs. The difference between the HUD established
allowable rents for each unit and the household contributiDn
is made up by regular payments from HUD to the project owner.
Assistance contracts between HUD and project sponsors cover
five-year periods and are renewable at the owner's discretion
for 20 to 40 years depending on the type of sponsor and the
kind of financing used.
Passage of the Section 8 Lower-Income Rental Assistance
Program in 1974 marked the beginning of a new era in the low-
income housing development process. Sponsors of such develop-
ments were again able to secure adequate subsidies and the MHFA
responded quickly to the renewed demand for mortgage financing.
The nature of the Section 8 program includes aspects that are
similar to previous housing assistance programs, but in general
Section 8's income eligibility criteria permit households whose
incomes are slightly higher than previous subsidy programs to
remain eligible for the subsidy to encourage more income mixing
-35-
and deconcentration of the poor. By allowing a household who
in the future becomes over-incomed to remain in the develop-
ment and pay the full FMR, the intent of Congress was to
create mixed-income housing which developers would perceive
as being less risky.1
The way the program works is that non-profit and profit-
motivated developers, alone or together with public housing
agencies, submit proposals for substantial rehabilitation or
new construction in response to invitations from HUD; or they
may apply directly to their State Housing Finance Agency.
Since our concern is only with MHFA financed housing, and the
vast majority of Section 8 units in Massachusetts are financed
by MHFA, we will not deal with the role that PHAs or the
Department of Community Affairs plays in the Section 8 develop-
ment process. Neither is the author able to document the
political process in which sponsors respond to invitations
fom HUD and receive Section 8 allocations independeltly from
MHFA. Surely this is relevant to the question of why more
elderly proposals are being financed, but it is outside of
the economic and legislative scope of this thesis.
One of the objectives of the Section 8 program states
that it should be so used so as to avoid further concentration
of the poor in the worst urban neighborhoods; and sample sur-
verys indicate that HUD has applied site selection criteria
accordingly for the new construction program, since most new
1. Arthur Solomon, "Federal Housing Policy: Background Paper
on Recurring Policy Issues," pg. 130
2. Thomas Kingsley and Deborah Both, RAND Corp. Pilot Urban
Impact Analysis: HUD's Section 8 NC/SR Program, August
1978, Chapter 1.
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construction projects are in neighborhoods with stable or
rising property values.
The allocation of funds is decided upon by a formula
which takes into account the following factors to determine
the areas' housing needs: population, poverty, housing over-
crowding, housing vacancies, substandard housing, and "other
objective measurable conditions." Census data on these var-
iables are assembled by HUD staff and combined to determine a
single percentage distribution for resources between HUD Area
2Office jurisdictions across the country.
The Existing Housing Program
Another aspect of the Section 8 Rental Subsidy Program is
the "Existing Housing Program." Eligible households are given
certificates and they must find privately owned existing units
in standard condition whose rents are within the published
fair market rent (FMR) tables. Local public housing agencies
administer the existing housing program, certifying eligible
tenants, inspecting the units proposed for subsidy, and con-
tracting with approved landlords for payment. Tenants execute
separate leases with landlords to pay their share of the rent
which is not to exceed 25 percent of adjusted income. HUD thus
subsidizes the difference between what a lower-income household
1.
2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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can afford and the FMR for an adequate housing unit.
The purpose of looking into the existing housing pro-
gram--even though it is administered by local public housing
agencies and not by the MHFA--is to assess whether house-
hold participation in that program in any way limits participa-
tion in the NC/SR programs of Section 8 that MHFA handles.
The question of whether the existing program affects the
demand for NC/SR units is valid, since the existing housing
program offers incentives that are not present anywhere else.
HUD maintains certain policy objectives within the existing
housing program which allow for increases in the existing FMR
of up to 32 percent over the FMR lids for units with four or
more bedrooms in areas where the housing market is unusually
tight; so it is necessary to consider whether these incen-
tives can explain any of the shift in MHFA financed construc-
tion from a balance of elderly and family units to mostly
elderly construction. These objectives are: 2
1) Helping large families;
2) Promoting deconcentration of the poor and minorities;
3) Aiding in lower income mobility; and
4) Housing the handicapped.
The reasons for these policy objectives being included in
the existing housing program rather than the NC/SR program are
1. Contract Research Corp., Fair Market Rents for the Existing
Housing Program, 31 May 1977, Belmont, Massachusetts,
No. PB 273373/AS.
2. Housing Affairs Letter, July 27, 1979, pg. 6, "Section 8
Existing Rents May Be Tighter."
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that 1) the existing housing supply offers a larger base
from which to improve lower income housing mobility and de-
concentration of the poor, and 2) existing units are consid-
ered to be equally appropriate but a much less expensive way
1
to provide housing for large families
Given this outlook, it is interesting to consider the
policy implications of budgeting greater resources through
a mechanism such as the Existing program to meet the needs
of households with children. Of course, the Existing program
does not expand the supply of housing; but it could be used
to increase the number of family households who benefit from
HUD subsidies.
The way the existing housing program pursues these
policy objectives is that HUD allows the local PHA to approve
rents of up to 32 percent over the FMRs for up to 25 percent
2
of their Section 8 allocation2. For the full 25 percent an
agency would have to get HUD field office approval3 .
Whether the incentives offered in the Section 8 Existing
housing program in any way limit the participation of large
family households in MHFA's NC/SR program is the point in
question. Granted, the Existing housing program contains
specific provisions which favor large families; the number
of households that benefit due to current funding levels
1. GAO Report, Evaluation of Alternatives for Financing, p.viii
2. Housing Affairs Letter, July 27, 1979, pg. 6
3. ibid.
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and the availability of large units in standard condition
is so limited compared to the number who are eligible that
the Existing program does not limit the need for large fam-
ilies to participate in the NC/SR aspect of Section 8 which
MHFA handles.
The Elevator Clause and Market Com-parables
One of the more significant provisions of the Section 8
program affecting the shift between elderly and family con-
struction is known as the elevator clause. This was enacted
in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 and
was intended to prohibit the use of Section 8 assistance
to housing units in high rise elevator projects for "families
211
with children unless there is no practical alternative '.
The amount of vandalism from youths within the projects and
the incidence of extortion and purse snatching on board ele-
vators against older more vulnerable residents became an in-
tolerable situation, so by 1977, HUD "had learned its lesson
not to put families with children in elevator structures3 ".
The effect this had on the shift to elderly construction
within MHFA must be viewed from the perspective that Section 8's
1. Contract Research Corporation, FMRs for the Existing
Program, 31 May 1977, Belmont, MA
2. "Lower Income Housing Assistance", Sec. 8 (c) (1), Limita-
tions.
3. Interview with Bob Flood, Vice Pres. for DiMeo Construc-
tion Co., 19 May 1980.
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regulations require the FMR's to be based on comparable
structure types within each submarket. In Boston, for
example, with land costs as high as they are, it makes
economic sense to build highrise rather than flats or
townhouse developments. Private market residential devel-
opers have done this for many years and successfully
captured the back-to-the-city luxury residential market.'
MHFA sponsors, therefore, have an incentive to build ele-
vator projects in Boston (which can only be occupied by
the elderly), since the market comparables upon which the
FMR's are determined in large part happen to be luxury
units. This is reflected in the fact that the FMR for a
one-bedroom elevated unit in Boston is $479 per month,
and it is comparable to what a retired household, widow,
or widower would spend if they had an annual income of
$22,944 and spent 25 percent of their income on rent.
Because of taxes and the cost of living, however, it is
doubtful that a one or two person household would desire
to spend fully 25 percent of their gross income on rent.
They would seek a less expensive apartment, thus leaving
the $478 per month unit to a one or two person household
of an even higher income who could more easily afford
such rent.
1. "Conversion of Charlestown Navy Yard into Luxury Apart-
ments," Poston Sunday Globe, 22 June 1980.
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This sheds light on the claims that at least in Boston
the FMR's have been set at levels which only upper income
households could afford in the private market, thus a great
incentive exists for sponsors to propose elderly projects.
In other market areas across the Commonwealth, the
connection between high EMR's due to the elevator clause
and project feasibility/desireability is a more complex
situation. Using the 1978 Operating Statements from MHFA
portfolio projects, a test was performed to quantify the
actual differences in operating expenses in various areas
controlling for the influence due to construction type and
market area of the projects. This was done to determine
how well the difference in the FMR tables reflect the true
cost of operation as it varies from region to region. For
the purpose of this comparison the amount of income avail-
able to a Section 8 project has been listed (see Table 8
below) in terms of the maximum dollar amount per unit per
year that a project may receive by FMR area. This has been
listed for both a typical one bedroom walkup and a one bed-
room elevated unitincluding the higher than FMR bonus factors
which will be discussed later. Beside the revenue column
is listed average operating expenses by FER area, and sub-
tracting the two shows the amount of revenue remaining
1. Kirk McClure, MHFA, "Impact of FMR Area on Actual Project
Operating Expenses," memorandum, 31 March 1980.
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available for debt service by FMR area. As indicated, the
areas of Boston, Salem, and Lowell are in a much better
position to leverage mortgage financing than the remaining
areas, and this is true for both elevated and non-elevated
structures. As a result, the bulk of activity (MHFA proposals,
financing and construction) occurs in the Boston, Salem and
Lowell areas. Within these three FMR areas, however, pro-
posals for elevated structures clearly outperform proposals
for non-elevated structures in their ability to leverage
mortgage financing. This contributes to the argument that
there has been a shift towards elderly housing in these
FMR areas due to the back-to-the-city luxury market compar-
ables upon which FMRs are based.
Elevated structures in the remaining FMR areas also out-
perform non-elevated structures in their ability to gain
mortgage financing (although by a narrower margin); yet
because sponsors of elderly developments in the southeastern
and western parts of the state propose non-elevated structure
types for elderly occupancy more often than elevated types,
it suggests that maximizing the revenue available for finan-
cing is not the only variable in predicting the structure and
occupancy type preference of sponsors by FMR area.
Another important variable is the impact of what struc-
ture types are allowable within certain localities and neigh-
borhoods along with the fact that lower land prices in less
urbanized areas would place less of an incentive on devel-
opers to build mid and high rise.
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The figures in Table 8 below indicate that the FMR
rents enable all housing developers (and especially sponsors
of elevated building types) in the FMR areas of Boston, Salem
and Lowell to leverage significantly higher amounts of mort-
gage financing than sponsors in the other FMR areas. This
partially explains why the overwhelming bulk of sponsor
interest, MHFA financing and construction activity occure
in these areas. The figures also suggest, however, that
FMR impact on mortgage financing is not the only factor in
predicting which building types generate the most developer
interest. Differences in operating costs ($ 4 21/year/unit
less for elderly units) are also important, so a need exists
not only to look to additional reasons to explain the shift--
but for HUD to review the differences between the FMRs in all
areas in an attempt to equalize the amounts of mortgage financ-
ing that can be leveraged. The reason why this is a desire-
able policy objective is due to the fact that, although con-
struction costs do vary across the state; the amount of var-
iance is much less than the variance of the FMRs and operating
1
costs on mortgage financing . The FMR and operating cost im-
pact on mortgage financing, for expampe, provides a sponsor
of family housing in Boston with 30 percent more financing
than one in Springfield and 34 percent more financing with
elderly units. On the contrary, actual construction costs
for materials and labor "aren't all that much different"
from one FMR area to another 2.
1. Kirk McClure, MHFA Mortgage Officer, interview, 12 Sept. 1980
2. ibid.
Table 8
HOW WELL FMR TABLES REFLECT THE TRUE COST OF OPERATION BETWEEN FMR REGIONS:
STUDY OF OPERATING EXPENSES
1 Bedroom Walkup 1 Bedroom Elevated
FMR
Area
Boston
Salem
Lowell
Cape Cod
Worcester
Fall River
Pittsfield
Springfield
Annual 1
Revenue
6,587
6,070
I5,793
$5,569t 5,787
"5,569
35,195
$5,172
Annual
Opr. 2
Expnses.
3,216
32,975
"2,924
3,075
.2,983
f2,940
T2,728
2,795
Revenue
Avail-
able for
Financing
3,371
t3,095
32,869
2,494
$2,804
32,629
32,467
32,377
Capitali-
zation of
Income at
8 Percent3
42,140
"38,682t 35,859
$31,169t)35,053
$32,865
$30,840
t29,718
Annual
Revenue'
S6,853
,6,170
6,242t5, 895,
5,776
q5,455
T5,036
5,062
Annual
Opr. 2
Expnses.
t2,795
f2,554
t32,503
$2,654
$2,562
$2,519
I 2,30732,374
Revenue
Avail-
able for
Financing
34,058
83616
"3,739t3,241
3,214
t2,936
C2,729
T2,688
Capitali-
zation of
Income at
8 Percent 3
t50,731
45,198
46,734
$40,508
140,172
36,703
$34,118
"33,604
Source: Compiled by Author from MHFA memo by Kirk McClure, March 31, 1980,
to Don Blackman, "Impact of Section 8 FMR Rent Area on Actual
Project Operating Expenses."
1. Annual Revenue is based on the Oct. 30, 1979 published FMRs for Massachusetts plus
the 20% higher than FMR limits for which all developments are eligible. It does
not include the additional 5 percent bonus for elderly units.
2. Elderly units cost $421/unit less per year to operate, andwhen this variable is
capitalized at 8% it accounts for $5,263 of the difference in money which can
be leveraged between family and elderly units.
3. 8 percent was the established rate at which sponsors obtained MHFA finacing
during most of 1979 and 1980.
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Income Eligibility Criteria
Although it is known that housing needs in Massa-
chusetts display a certain distribution between elderly
and family households--47 percent elderly; 53 percent
family as of January 1, 1980 (See Table 1 above)--it is
necessary to examine the characteristics of Section 8's
target population by household type and size to determine
whether income eligibility criteria limit the partici-
pation of family households and thus helps to explain
the shift towards elderly developments.
HUD economists in each region are responsible for
determining median income levels for each county by
household size and limiting participation in Section 8
to those households whose yearly income falls under a
two-tiered ceiling. Table 9 below lists the Section 8
household income limits based on 1979 median incomes by
household size and geographic area.
1. Low income households are those whose income is less
than 80 percent of the area media, and very low income
households are defined as those whose incomes are only
50 percent of the area median.
Table 9
SECTION 8 INCOME ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
NUMBER OF PERSONS PER
AREA
Boston SMSA
Low
Very Low
ONE
10,850
6,800
TWO
12,400
7,750
Brockton SMSA
Low 10,300 11,800
Very Low 6,450 7,350
Fall River SMSA
Low
Very Low
9,800
5,500
11,200
6,300
Fitchburg/Leominster SMSA
Low 9,800 11,200
Very Low 6,050 6,900
Lawrence/Haverhill SMSA
Low 10,150 11,600
Very Low 6,350 7,250
Lowell SMSA
Low
Very Low
10,350 11,850
6,500 7,400
THREE
13,950
8,750
13,250
8,300
12,600
7,050
12,600
7,800
13,050
8,150
13,300
8,300
FOUR
15,500
9,700
14,700
9,200
14,000
7,850
14,000
8,650
14,500
9,0'50
14,800
9,250
(continued onnext page)
FAMILY
FIVE
16,500
10,500
15,650
9,950
14,850
8,500
14,850
9,350
15,400
9,750
15,700
10,000
SIX
17,450
11,250
16,550
10,650
15,750
9,100
15,750
10,050
16,300
10,500
16,650
10,750
SEVEN
18,450
12,050
17,500
11,400
16,6oo
9,750
16,600
10,750
17,200
11,200
17,550
11 ,450
EIGHT
19,400
12,800
18,400
12,150
17,500
10,350
17,500
11,400
18,100
11,950
18,500
12,200
Table 9, cont.
NUMBER OF PERSONS PER FAMILY
ARiA
New Bedford SN
Low
Very Low
Pittsfield SMS
Low
Very Low
ONE TWO
9,800 11,200
5,550 6,300
10,000
6,250
11,450
7,150
Springfield/Chicopee/Holyoke
Low 9,800 11,200
Very Low 5,950 6,800
Worcester SMSA
Low
Very Low
0,150 11,600
6,350 7,250
Providence/Pawtucke t/Warwick
Low 9,800 11,200
Very Low 6,000 6,850
THREE
12,600
7,100
12,900
8,050
SMSA
12,600
7,650
13,050
8,150
SMSA
12,600
7,700
Barnstable County SMSA
Low 9,050 10,350 11,650
Very Low 5,530 6,100 6,900
FOUR
14,000
7,900
14,300
8,950
14,000
8,500
14,500
8,050
14,000
8,550
12,900
7,650
FIVE
14,850
8,550
15,200
9,650
14,850
9,200
15,400
9,750
14,850
9,250
13,750
8,250
SIX
15,750
9,150
16,100
10,400
SEVEN
16,600
9,800
17,000
11,100
15,750 16,600
9,850 10,550
16,300
10,500
15,750
9,900
14,550
8,850
17,200
11,200
16,600
10,600
15,350
9,500
(continued on next page)
EIGHT
17,500
10,450
17,900
11,800
17,500
11,200
18,100
11,950
17,500
11,300
16,150
10,100
Table 9, cont.
NUMBER OF PERSONS PER FAMILY
AREA ONE
Berkshire Co.
Low 9,050
Very Low 5,550
Essex Co.
Low
Very Low
Hampden Co.
Low
Very Low
Hampshire Co.
Low
Very Low
Middlesex Co.
Low 1
Very Low
Weymouth Co.
Low
Very Low
9,900
6,200
TWO THREE
10,350 11,650
6,300 7,100
11,350 12,750
7,100 7,950
9,200 10,500
5,750 6,550
9,750
6,100
0,400
6,500
11,150
6,950
11,800
7,400
12,550
7,850
11,900 13,500
7,450 8,350
9,150 10,450
5,700 6,500
11,750
7,350
FOUR FIVE
12,900 13,750
7,900 8,550
14,150
8,850
13,100
8,200
13,900
8,700
14,900
9,300
13,050
8,150
15,050
9,550
Six
14,550
9,150
15,950
10,250
13,950 14,750
8,850 9,500
14,800
9,400
15,650
10,100
15,800 16,750
10,050 10,800
13,850 14,650
8,800 9,450
of HUD, Section 8 Family Income Limits Based on 1979 Median
Incomes: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston Area Office, 30 July 1979.
Ir
SEVEN
15,350
9,800
16,800
10,950
15,600
10,150
16,550
10,800
17,650
11,550
15,500
10,100
EIGHT
16,150
10,450
17,700
11,700
16,400
10,800
17,400
11,500
18,600
12,300
16,300
10,750
Source: U.S. Dept.
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In all geographic areas for low income eligibility
there appears to be a slight bias which restricts partici-
pation of families consisting of five or more persons.
This is evidenced in Figure 2 below by the fact that the
income ceiling is increased by $1,250-$1,550 for the second,
third and fourth persons; but the income ceiling is increas-
ed by only $800-$1,000 for each of the fifth, sixth, seventh
and eighth persons.
Figure 2
SECTION 8's INCOME ELIGIBILITY INCREMENTS
Boston (Highest) Barnstable (Lowest)
Increment
Per
Person
Number
of
People
Income
Limit
Increment
Per
Person
1. 10,850 1,550 1. 9,050 ID1,300
2 . '(S12 ,400 ID1 , 550 2. -110 , 350 D11 v300
3. : 13,950 1,550 3. 11,650 $1,250
4. 1 15,500 t1,000 4. 12,900: 850
5. 16,500 950 5. } 13,750$ 800
6. 17,450 ,00 6. :D14,55 800
7. i18,450 $ 950 7. $15,350 %D 800
8. $19,400 1 950 8. 116,150 $ 800
Source: Compiled by the Author from HUD's Section 8 Family
Income Limits Based on 1979 Median Incomes: Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, Boston Area Office.
On the surface this does appear to be a bias against
larger family participation. However, most economists would
Number
of
People
Income
Limit
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agree that certain economies of scale in the cost of liv-
ing can be realized with a larger family and therefore the
drop in the incremental income ceiling increase does not
effectively discriminate against families.
Another indication that the Section 8 Income Eligibility
Criteria do not limit family participation is found in HUD's
own findings that only 22% of all Section 8 eligible house-
holds are elderly . Yet, since nationally the elderly repre-
sent approximately 76% of all Section 8 participants2 and
the experience in Massachusetts is similar 3 ; it suggests
that the most compelling reasons for the shift towards elderly
housing are things other than the subtle and almost unnotice-
able drop in the incremental income ceiling as family size
increases.
FMR Impact on Replacement Costs and Feasibility
Another test has been performed at MHFA to translate
the most recently published FMR limits into dollars that
can be leveraged for building construction in order to deter-
mine how adequately they compare with recent actual costs.
The usefulness of this test is that it shows how much of a
discrepancy exists between the cost of what is actually
1.Gilmer Blakespoor and Susan Jaffee, Lower Income Housing
Assistance Programs (Section 8): Interim Findings of Eval-
uation Research, U.S. Dept. of HUD, pg. 103
2. ibid.
3. See Table 3 above in the Introduction.
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being built, and the amount of money that can be leveraged
for elderly versus family structures by FMR Area. Obviously,
the amount of construction capital that a developer can lev-
erage from the published FMR tables has a lot to do with
his willingness to propose developments in any given area.
These figures are especially important in areas where the
amount of capital that can be leveraged is less than the
amount that builders in the state have already been spending
on completed developments. It is no incentive to propose
a development if the rent figures indicate that the developer
is going to have to build units with less money than in
the past.
Table 10
FMR IMPACT ON REPLACEMENT COSTS AND FEASIBILITY
Elderly/ Elevated Family /Walkup
Available Available
FMR Area Replacement As a per- Replace- As a per-
Amt./Unit * centage of ment centage of
1979 Aver- Amt./Unit* 1979 Aver-
age Replace- age Replace-
ment Cost ** ment Cost**
Boston $50,731 119% $42,140 99%
Lowell $45,198 105% $38,682 91%
Salem $46,734 109% $35,859 84%
Cap.e Cod .40,508 95% $31,169 73%
Worcester $40,172 94 $35,053 82%
Fall River $36,703 86% $32,865 77%
Pittsfield $34,118 80% 30,840 71%
Springfield $33,604 79% $29,718 70%
* determined by capitalizing at 8% the flow of net operating
income from the FMRs.
**the 1979 average replacement cost per unit was $42,724.
Source: Kirk McClure, "Review of Section 8 FMRs Published
October 31, 1979: Estimated Impact on Project Feas-
ibility," memorandum dated November 28, 1979.
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What the figures in Table 10 indicate is that in the next
year of processing projects, it will be very difficult to devel-
op any family jobs of typical size and bedroom distribution.
Even in the very high FMR areas of Boston, Salem and Lowell,
there does not appear to be adequate income to leverage the
development of family housing as the increased income is
more than offset by the overall rate of inflation leaving
less money to build a project than was available in 1979.1
The same is not the case for elderly projects. Projects
developed in Boston, Salem and Lowell will have greater amounts
of replacement dollars available than has been the case in
1979 while the other market areas of the state will have
less. Thus, these few are able to sustain inflation rates
while the others can not 2 .
These differences between market areas in the leverag-
able funds per unit result directly from the decision made
by HUD to grant increases to the FMRs on a straight percent-
age basis. Although all rents are increased by the same
percentage, this increase means a greater operating leverage
in those areas with higher original rents. In light of how
construction costs tend to increase by constant dollar amounts
across the state, 3 the areas with the lowest original rents
are being penalized as are the prospects for doing family
projects in the areas that already cannot pass financial
feasibility.
1. Kirk McClure, MHFA, interview, 12 June 1980
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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The result is likely to be a continuation of MHFA's
1979 experience in which 5,200 units were financed with 77%
of the units intended for the elderly (see Table 3 above).
Because the increases granted to the Section 8 rents worsen
this problem, the trend towards fewer units for family occ-
upancy will probably continue.
The Impact of 5% Higher FMR Limits for Elderly Developments
Perhaps one of the most controversial and misunderstood
aspects of the Section 8 program is the regulation that allows
developers to receive as much as a 5% increase in the FMR
for a particular unit if that unit is to be occupied by an
1
elderly household . The rational for the 5% differential is
that federal laws and regulations require more amenities and
more expensive architectural and design criteria for elderly
units than for comparable family units2 . This assumes that
all else is constant and that the cost of such features as
common rooms, greater fireproofing, ramps, grabbars, and
intercoms directly calls for the 5% higher FMR. Whether or
not this is true is difficult to proved, but the GAO has
recently published a report calling for an end to this "un-
warranted" differential . An understanding of its impacts
1. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Section 880,
"FMR Limits and Exception Rents".
2. Jane Bloom, "1972 is Shaping Up To Be a Big Year for the
Elderly," pg. 402-407
3. The author made repeated and persistent attempts through
HUD in Washington and Boston to locate any material that
would justify the 5% differential and yet failed to get
anything but a bureaucratic "passing of the buck."
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will be presented, however, in an effort to explain its role
in the shift that favors the development of elderly housing .
Basically there are two reasons why the 5% differential
has a significant impact on the developer's decision to pre-
fer elderly housing;
1) the obvious advantage of higher operating revenues,
2) its effect of being able to increase the total replace-
ment costs and the resultant syndication proceeds;
but to understand these it is necessary to perform a financial
analysis on tow representative projects (see Figure 3 below).
Actual and projected MHFA portfolio expenses are utilized to
isolate as much as possible the impact of the 5% FMR differen-
tial; and the estimates of 1980 operating expenses ($2,795/
elderly and $3,216/family unit) were developed by projecting
forward 1979 actual operating expenses at an average infla-
tion rate of 7 percent 2, using a sample of 24 portfolio pro-
jects with good management records.
If neither project was eligible for the 5 percent higher
FMR limit (line 11), the elderly project illustrated in this
figure would have a cash surplus of $173,336 and still remain
in good financial condition. Since family developments are
not eligible for the 5% bonus, it is not necessary to reduce
the after financing cash flow for the sake of comparison.
1. GAO Report, Evaluation of Alternatives for Financing Low
and Moderate Income Rental Housing, September 1980.
2. Kirk McClure "Income Necessary to Develop Feasible Projects
at Below Market Interest Rates," memorandum, MHFA, 5 May 1980
Figure 3
CASH FLOW ANALYSIS FOR TYPICAL ELDERLY AND FAMILY DEVELOPMENTS 11979
Family Developments
in Walkup Buildings
Elderly Developments
in Elevated Buildings
Bedroom Distribution (BRs/Unit)*
3 4 Total
Bedroom Distribution (BRs/Unit)*
1 2 3 4 Total
1. No. of units 100 92 22 6 220 200 20 0 0 220
2. Max. Boston FMR $ 530 585 684 823 $ 574 648
3. Gross Mos.
Income
(line 1x2) $53,000 $53,820 $15,048 $ 4,938 $114,800 $12,960
4. 5fo FMR Bonus 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.05 1.05
5. Max. Gross
Monthly Inc.
(line 3x4) $53,000 $53,820 $15,048 $ 4,938 $126,806 $120,540 $13,608 $134,148
6. Conversion to Yearly
Gross Income...............
7. Maintenance, Management,
taxes, utilities, reserve
& return @ $3,216/unit**...
8. Debt service on $8,459,352
@ 8% over 30 years***.....
9. Total Costs................
10. After FinancingCash Flow...
11. Minus the 5% FMR Bonus.....
x12
$1,521,672
7.
.. $707,520
..$744,884
..................
.. . . . . . . .0 0 0 0& a 000 I
12. Equalized After Financing Cash Flow.........
(1,452,4o4)
69,268
0-
69,269
x12
.$1,609,776
Maintenance
etc. at
$2,795/unit** $614,900
...... .... .$744,884
.................... (1,359,784)
249,992
.... 6,6561
173,336
*Consistent with MHFA's required mix of 50%-1 BR; 25% 2 BR; 25% 3 BR; Arch. Guide
**Using sample of 24 projects with good management records: Kirk McClure Memo. of Op
***Based on MHFA's 1979 average replacement costs of $42,274/unit for all types of un
Information is not available on the average by various types.
Source: Compiled by the Author
1 2
Costs
its.
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The lower $69,269 remainder itself is adequate to suggest
that attaining financial feasibility with family projects un-
der today's conditions is a much more difficult task. Like-
wise existing State financed family developments are more
likely to risk encountering operating deficits ; and this con-
tributes to a developer's inclination to propose elderly
housing. The weight of the 5 percent differential, therefore,
must be acknowledged but kept in perspective by certain con-
straints. Since all profit-motivated sponsors of MHFA sub-
sidized housing are limited to a 6% rate of return on cash
equity, the weight of the cash flow argument is diminished.
But, on the other. hand, if the sponsor is able to submit an
acceptably designed proposal which "justifies" the full FMR
and the 5 percent bonus factor; the advantage of this to the
sponsor is that all the financial aspects of the development
are increased--the replacement cost, depreciation losses and
syndication proceeds.
Conversely, if the archetectural design and replacement
costs do not "justify" the 5% higher FMR, it is of no bene-
fit to the sponsor of elderly housing.
Builders' and Sponsors' Profit and Risk Allowance BSPRA
Another reason why building for the elderly is more
popular among Section 8 sponsors concerns the 10% Builders'
and Sponsors' Profit and Risk Allowance (BSPRA). The BSPRA
1. GAO Report, Evaluation of Alternatives for Financing, pg. iv.
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has been part of the federal housing laws since 19651,
and it provides an up front one-time profit and risk
allowance of 10% over the construction costs of materials,
labor, fees and financing. No ceiling is placed on how
high the BSPRA can reach, so it is clearly in the sponsor's
interest (given a certain number of units) to produce a
development with the highest possible overall cost (see
Figure 5 below).
The reason why HUD continues to rely on the 10% BSPRA
2is that in 1973 a HUD policy study recommended the leasing
program be expanded and changed to resemble as closely as
possible the direct cash assistance approach then being ad-
vocated by HUD and the Nixon Administration. The essence
of HUD's recommendation was to get HUD out of the role it
had assumed under prior housing supply programs of de-
ciding the quantity and distribution of housing develop-
ments for low income families. The change gave private
developers the incentive for profit and the risk of loss
in the construction and management of such housing3.
Thus with greater responsibility, it was inevitable that
Section 8 sponsors would seek to minimize their risks and
guard investment decisions at every opportunity.
1. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, v. 4
1974, "Leased Housing Legislative History," pg. 4314-4317.
2. ibid.
3. Ibid.
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Since their operating return is limited under MHFA,
one of the few options for increasing the volume of the
sponsor's income is toraximize their one-time gain under
the BSPRA through optimizing the use of land and encourag-
ing the use of amenities which result in higher costs/sq. foot.
Optimizing the Use of Land
Attempts to maximize the number of units per acre,
however, must fall within MHFA density guidelines for new
construction, and according to these standards,
Density determinations will be based on
several factors including the density
of adjacent land and that of community,
livability, economic viability, and
good management. Ten units per acre.
is a goal for the maximum successful
density for low-rise developments
while 12 and 16 units per floor are the
respective goals for mid- and high-rise
developments.
Furthermore,
All three bedroom and four bedroom units
should have private exterior entrances
and private yards adjacent to the units.
Elderly units are designed to the same
spatial and quality standards as all
other one bedroom and two bedroom units,
but must also meet the requirements for
elderly units specified in the HUD Mini-
mum Property Standards (MPS).1
Obviously within these guidelines a mid- or high-
rise building will allow more units per acre than walk-
ups; so, to the extent sponsors are developing elevated
structures which only permit elderly occupants (and that
is most common) they will maximize the number of units
per acre and their BSPRA.
1. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, Architect's Guide,
Boston, 1980, pp. 11-13.
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Another aspect of elderly housing that lends itself
to maximizing the number of units per acre and the BSPRA
concerns lower elderly housing parking requirements. Most
local zoning ordinances require 200 percent parking accommo-
dations for multi-family housing, and the following repre-
seis MHFA's suggested figures:
Figure 4
MHFA'S ELDERLY/FAMILY PARKING REQUIREMENTS
Elderly Family
Urban 1/3 space per unit 2 spaces per unit
Mid-Sized City 1/2 space per unit 2 spaces per unit
Suburban/Rural 2/3 space per unit 2 spaces per unit
Source: MHFA's Architect's Guide, Pg. 13.
Typical elderly developments are able to demonstrate a
reduction in the need for parking facilities since elderly
households tend to own no more than one car per household,
and many others do not drive. 2 Lower parking requirements
translate into higher densities and higher BSPRA per acre.3
1. Kirk McClure, interview, MHFA, 12 September 1980.
2. Stuart Kessler, "Housing for Who?,":Buildings, pg. 64
3. See Figure 9, below.
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As examples of the widely varying spatial requirements
of elderly versus family housing, Figures 5 and 6 follow.
These are followed by Figures 7 and 8 which illustrate the
greater amenities and the higher costs per square foot that
get built into elderly developments.
Figure 5
EXAMPLE OF SPATIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FAMILY HOUSING
"The Hamlet was developed by the Newton Community Development
Foundation with a loan of $1,989,200 from MHFA. The develop-
ment provides townhouse living for 50 families in the Chestnut
Hill section of Newton and was designed by Mintz Associates."
Source: 1978 MHFA Annual Report
rp-1,
S&ftd
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Figure 6
EXAMPLE OF SPATIAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR ELDERLY HOUSING
"A Building at Willow and Blake Streets in Lynn is being
converted into 70 units of elderly housing. Built in 1891,
the structure formerly was devoted to factory and commercial
use. 'Rolfe House,' as it will be known when recycled, will
cost $2.5 million. Dimeo Construction Co. of Providence and
Boston has been named construction manager and general contrac-
tor. A park will be created between the building and an
adjacent one, ESO, Inc., of Brookline is the architect."
Source: Boston Globe, 30 March 1980.
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Figure 7
EXAMPLES OF THE AMENITIES AND THE HIGHER
COSTS PER SQUARE FOOT THAT ARE BUILT INTO ELDERLY HOUSING
"Developed by Winn Development Company, Coes Pond Village
is a 250-unit housing development in Worcester that respects
both the needs of the residents and the area's natural surround-
ings. The high-rise complex is located on a heavily wooded
10-acre site overlooking Coes Pond and was financed by MHFA
with a loan of $7,189,438. Designed by Eisenberg Associates,
Inc. and Henry Schadler Associates, the development includes
such amenities as individual outdoor garden plots, a green-
house, health club, putting green and arts and crafts studio."
(emphasis supplied by the Author)
Source: 1977 MHFA, Annual Report
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Figure 8
EXAMPLES OF THE AMENITIES AND THE HIGHER
COSTS PER SQUARE FOOT THAT ARE BUILT INTO ELDERLY HOUSING
"The Blackstone was developed by the State Street Development
Company with a loan of $5,965,000 from MHFA. The 145-unit,
high-rise apartment complex caters to the needs of elderly
persons and was designed by Haring & Associates, Inc. and
Archplan, Inc. The development is located on the site of the
former Blackstone Junior High School in Boston's West End
Urban Renewal Area." (Emphasis supplied by the Author)
Source: 1977 MHFA Annual Report
Figure 9
ELDERLY VS. FAMILY DENSITY AND BSPRA SETUP
Assumptions:
- Each project has five acres and involves new construction;
- Fifty percent parking requirements for elderly; 200 percent
for family;
- 1.15 Ave. BR/unit for elderly; 1.6 Ave. BR/unit for family;
- Elevated structure for elderly; walkups for families;
- Average construction costs, fees, insurance, and financing
costs total $38,840/unit (not including the cost of land);
- Local zoning ordinances limit parking and
no more than 40 percent of the land area.
Elde rly
buildings to cover
Family
Number of units on five acres..
Average construction cost/unit.
Plus 10% BSPRA.................
Total Replacement Cost
($42,724 average)...........
Minus 90% MHFA Financing.......
Equals 10% Owner's Equity......
Again, Minus BSPRA.............
Equals Actual Cash Equity......
(Approximately 1%)
220
$38,840
8,544,800
854,480
9,399,280
8,459,352
939,928
854,480
85,448
80
$38,840
3,107,200
310,7201.
3,417,920
3,076,128
341,792
310,720
31,072
Source: Compiled by the Author.
1. The amount of land that would be necessary to develop
and generate a $854,480 BSPRA for family housing with
the assumptions in Figure 9 is 12.2 acres; and since
problems with local authorities in the initial development
process are likely to be greater as the acreage increases; 2
the Section 8 regulations which make higher densities and
more comfortable after financing cash flows possible for
sponsors of elderly housing tend to inhibit the desires
of sponsors to do family housing.
2. Interfaith Housing Corporation, Housing in the Suburbs,
Chapter 4.
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Since the above figures, regardless of density, demon-
strate how the BSPRA reduces the sponsor's actual cash equity
down to approximately one percent of the actual construction
costs which exclude land; it is important to put the resultant
paper equity concept into perspective and understand why there
is the desire to build large costly elderly developments.
The reasons are because:
1) the subsidy is guaranteed over the life of the mortgage,
2) it is profitable to maximize the depreciation and tax
shelter benefits, and
3) they are confident that when the tax benefits wear out
the property will have appreciated in value and can be
sold for a healthy capital gain.
All this is possible using only a small percentage of one's
own money and having a guaranteed cash flow adequate to pay
operating and debt service costs.
Costs Per Square Foot
Another way that sponsors of elderly housing are able
to maximize their BSPRA is due to how Section 8 architectural
and design criteria contribute to higher costs per square foot
1for elderly construction . HUD's Minimum Property Standards
(MPS) include:
1) greater fireproofing (4 hour versus 2 hour for family),
2) security and intercom systems,
3) common rooms for social activities,
4) wider doorways to accommodate persons restricted to
wheelchairs,
1. Ronald Derven, "Housing for Who?", pg. 62-68.
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5) push bars- instead of doorknobs on hallway and
firedoors;
6) and night lights and grabbers in bathrooms.
These amenities together with the generally acknowledged
fact that additional bedrooms are the cheapest square feet'
combine to show how elderly projects cost more per square
foot and yield the greatest BSPRA (see illustrations of
amenities in Figures 7 and 8, above).
One caveat to this situation and something that the
MHFA and HUD have no control over is that an experienced
developer can realize construction cost savings because of
the consistency in the types of units. Unlike family housing:
You are confining yourself to one, two, perhaps
three different types of units. This should re-
sult in fairly regular structural spans, con-
sistent mechanical and electrical layouts, and
standardization of kitchen cabinets and other
items. Therefore, you have more money to play
with in terms of creating amenities, or just
building a better project with fewer future
maintenance problems.z
Note that the incentive is to immediately put any
cost savings back into the project rather than use them to
reduce the mortgage. This is directly attributable to the
BSPRA being a percentage of the costs rather than a fixed
fee. Whether experience has shown, however, that the long-
term costs and benefits of a percentage payment schedule is
superior to a fixed fee is not the subject of this thesis.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., pg. 65,66.
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The point is merely to establish the connection between the
ten percentage payment and the preference of sponsors to
build elderly housing due to the higher figures from which
their allowance is paid.
Higher Limits on the Percentage of Subsidized Units for
Elderly Developments
The Rent Supplement Program, begun in 1965, specified a
20 percent limit on the percentage of units which could re-
ceive the subsidy within a given development. Since the
rent supplements were intended for especially poor and dis-
advantaged households, and since Congress and the Administra-
tion did not want to duplicate the tenantry of public housing,
limiting the percentage of households receiving this deeper
subsidy was seen as a way of deconcentrating the poor and the
resultant morass of social problems.
The same philosophy emerged in the initial formulation
of the Section 8 subsidy program in the form of an administra-
tive processing and funding preference given to developments
in which no more than 20 percent of the units proposed sought
the subsidy. This was believed more likely to assure a
reasonable range of incomes and possibly mitigate some of the
social problems that are found in neighborhoods where there is
a high concentration of poorer households.
The 1974 Housing and Community Development Act, however,
1. U.S. Code Congressional, "Leased Housing Legislative
History," pg. 4303.
-68-
made an exception to this 20 percent limit; and this excep-
tion has a direct impact on the shift towards elderly
housing.1 The Act specifically states that the Secretary of
HUD can allow up to 100 percent of a project's elderly ten-
ants who are eligible for deeper subsidies to receive them--
even when all or substantially all of the project's tenants
are elderly.
The exception was made for the elderly because Congress
believed the benefits of achieving an economic mix in the
projects and avoiding concentrations of the poor are most
clearly discernable when families with children rather than
the elderly are involved. Their thinking also included the
feeling that when applied to the elderly, the 20 percent
limit would have little effect other than to render an ade-
quate level of housing assistance unavailable for some
households.2
The 1974 Act further mandates that 30 percent of the
Section 8 funds must go to reach very low income households;
and evidence thatihis provides developers with many elderly
to choose from and allows developers to avoid family housing
is given by the fact that nationally in 1978 the average income
of elderly Section 8 occupants was $3,071. Non-elderly
Section 8 households had higher incomes than the elderly,
averaging $5,537 in 1978.3 Thus many elderly whose incomes
1. U.S. Congress, Select Committee on Aging, Housing for the
Elderly: the Federal Response, 1976, pg. 14.
2. U.S. CodeCongressional, "Leased Housing Legislative History,"
pg. 4303.
3. Thomas Kingsley and Deborah Both, RAND Corp., Pilot Urban
Impact Analysis: HUD's Section 8 NC/SR Program, pg. 32.
-69-
were too low to afford even the rents in Section 236 subsi-
dized interest developments are eligible for Section 8
assistance.
The effect all this has on the developer is that he will
prefer to build elderly housing for two reasons: 1) He can
satisfy the letter of the law without becoming involved with
very low income families and the difficulties that are attri-
buted to serving them; and 2) since housing for the elderly is
the only project type for which a developer can be assured a
full subsidy, many prefer doing elderly simply for the fed-
eral guarantee on the flow of income.'
In light of some bad experiences encountered under the
Section 236 interest subsidy program, it is understandable
that sponsors desire the highest possible guarantee on the
flow of income. 2 Non-payment of rent and delinquencies took
a heavy toll on the financial feasibility of many Section 236
family projects,3 so the 100 percent limit for elderly house-
hold subsidies under Section 8 is considered to be a major
concession to the development community.
However, despite the stated preference for economically
mixed housing by HUD, 90 percent of all Section 8 family pro-
4jects are completely subsidized. Since HUD is increasingly
forced to compromise its mixed income family policy objective,
1. Arthur Solomon, "Federal Housing Policy: Background Paper on
Recurring Policy Issues,"pg. 95.
2. Chuck McSweeney, interview, E.0.C.D., 30 May 1980.
3. GAO Report, Section 236 Rental Housing: An Evaluation, pg. 14.
4. Gilmer Blakespoor and Susan Jaffee, Lower Income Housing
Assistance Programs (Section 8), pp. 162-63.
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the ability of their 100 percent elderly subsidy to explain
the shift towards elderly housing is drastically diminished.
Nevertheless, the 100 percent elderly subsidy allowance pro-
vides sponsors with an open door that the sponsors of family
housing cannot take for granted.
The Amount of Subsidy by Household Type
Another argument can be made that the reason sponsors
prefer elderly housing is because they know that average in-
comes for elderly occupants is less than for family house-
holds; and therefore, as a percentage of the total rent the
management must rely upon a greater share of the rent coming
from the tenant in the case of family housing. Therefore,
why not do elderly housing and rest on the fact that the
federal government's monthly subsidy accounts for almost the
full contract rent?
Sponsors naturally desire to do developments that pre-
sent the least risk and the greatest opportunity in terms of
syndication and BSPRA benefits--yet an equally important ques-
tion is the extent to which the preference of sponsors to do
elderly projects results in higher subsidy costs to the Sec-
tion 8 program. In other words, we should not assume that
what is good for the sponsors is good for HUD. The author
suggests that the performance of sponsors under the Section 8
program has led not only to inequities that deny family house-
holds participation; but to add insult to injury, HUD and the
federal taxpayers are paying higher costs than if the program
served family and elderly households more equally.
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The information in the following illustration is based
on October 31, 1979, published FMR's for Boston using a one-
bedroom elevated structure for the elderly and a one-bedroom
walkup for families. Average elderly and non-elderly tenant
incomes for 1978 are also used in this illustration as a rel-
ative measure for comparing the amount of Section 8 subsidy
by household type.
Figure 10
.AVERAGE DIFFERENCE IN SECTION 8 SUBSIDY BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE
1978 average elderly contribution: $3,701 x .25 = $925-25
1978 average non-elderly contribution: $5,537 x .25 = $1,384.25
Elderly
Subsidy
Family
Subsidy
Maximum Annual Rental for
One BR Units : Oct. '79 Boston..$ 6,853 $ 6,587
Tenant Contribution 921 1,384
HUD Subsidy* 5,928 5,203
Subsidy Differential 725/yr 0
Tenant's Contribution as a 925 -135 1,384 -
Percentage of Rental Income > 6,587
.210
Source: Compiled by the Author
* FY 1981 subsidies are expected to average $6,250/yr. for SR
developments (most often elderly tenant occupied) and $5,300 -
$5,900 in new construction. Compared with the estimated
cost of public housing at $4,450/yr, "these high costs are
causing substantial backlash in Congress and among the pub-
lic who see that the cost of subsidized housing exaeeds the
rent that ordinary citizens must pay besides serving only a
small percentage of the population." (National Community
Development Association Newsletter, Washington, 3 December 1980,
pg. 28).
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Another illustration (Figure 11 below) shows a more
current and complete perspective on whether the preference
of sponsors to do elderly projects results in higher sub-
sidy costs to the Section 8 program. The difference is that
in Figure 11 it is assumed that all tenants had incomes at
the maximum of Section 8's income eligibility criteria for
lower income families by household size. This results in a
tenant contribution of 25 percent of the full income limit.
Again we see that the preference of sponsors to do eld-
erly developments results in higher per unit subsidy payments
from the federal government--and this is consistent with
Solomon's findings that many Section 8 elderly housing spon-
sors participate in the program because the federal govern-
ment's monthly subsidy accounts for almost the full amount
of the rent and the flow of income is guaranteed for the
life of the mortgage. 2
1. See Table 9 above.
2. Arthur Solomon, 'ederal Housing Policy: Background Paner
on Recurring Policy £ssues,"pg. 89.
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Figure 11
DIFFERENCE IN HUD SECTION 8 SUBSIDY BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE
PER MONTH
Tenant Contribution
Source: Compiled by the Author from "Section 8 Income Limits"
1 2 3 4 5
Number of Bedrooms per Household
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For example, the tenant's contribution as a percentage
of contract rent for elderly and family households is quite
different. Using 1978 average annual incomes of Section 8
participants and the maximum adjusted FMR for the Boston
area reveals the following.
Figure 12
TENANT'S CONTRIBUTION AS A PERCENTAGE
Bedroom Size Elderly
OF 1979 BOSTON FMRs
Family
Studio V7.10/mo sV.1 5 35/mo .27
One Bedroom $7710/mos. 13 $11535/mos.= .22$574 $530
Two Bedroom 
.10/mos'= 2 L5.35/mos.= .20
Source: Compiled by the author.
The risk of higher collection- losses due to delinquent
rent payments is clearly less of a factor in elderly housing
developments as evidenced above, and the importance of this as
a factor for explaining the preference of sponsors to develop-
ment elderly housing is very significant. Since collection
losses vary from development to development it is not possible
to say precisely how it ranks among other factors, but the
following example which compares a 20 percent collection loss
from tenants in each kind of development shows how sponsors
would prefer elderly housing.
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Figure 13
COMPARING THE EFFECT
OF A 20 PERCENT COLLECTION LOSS BY TYPES OF TENANTS
Elderly Family
Total Annual Tenant
Contribution* $171,600 $273,660
20 Percent Collection Loss x.20 x.20
Annual Loss of Income # 34,320 $ 54,732
Source: Compiled by the author.
* Figures were calculated by multiplying the percentages
according to bedroom size and type of household in Figure
12 by the rent profiles in Figure 3.
CONCLUSIONS
Various aspects of theSection 8 rental assistance pro-
gram clearly contain some of the most significant forces which
explain the shift towards elderly housing. One of these
forces is the legislative intent ofCongress to shift more of
,the responsibility and the risk of subsidized housing onto
the private sector. This was brought about by;1
1) letting private sponsors decide the location and char-
acter of subsidized housing;
2) reducing the insurance coverage provided by the FHA
for State HFA financed developments, and
3) encouraging State HFAs to be good managers of risk and
to monitor each development's progress.
1. U.S.Code Congressional, Leased Housing Legislative History
pg. 4303.
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From a purely economic and legislative perspective,
it is easy then to presume that the response of the develop-
ment community and the response of the MHFA in mortgage lend-
ing was the logical and inevitable result of a risky and
oompetitive process. One should be reminded, however, before
wholly accepting this conclusion that further research is
necessary to measure the impact of the political process as
an explanation of why more elderly units are being produced.
Another aspect of the Section 8 program which has a lead-
ing role in explaining the shift to elderly housing is the
ten percent BSPRA. Since the ten percent BSPRA is figured
in the same manner for all types of proposals regardless of
structure type or occupancy tenure, the key to making the
most of the BSPRA becomes developing proposals with the high-
est replacement cost dollar amount. Given the constraint
of land, and the impact of FMRs on replacement cost and
feasibility, plus the inevitable reality that smaller units
cost more per square foot (the lower cost of bedroom footage
factor), it is generally easier to conceive and propose
more feasible and expensive overall packages with housing for
the elderly than housing for families. Why it is important to
maximize the BSPRA is because the developer wants to:
1) reduce his actual cash equity;
2) maximize the total depreciable basis and the resultant
tax shelter opportunity; and
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3) realize the highest capital gain if the property is sold.
The elevator clause is another significant factor in
explaining the shift towards elderly housing. One reason
is that MHFA sponsors have an incentive to build elevator
projects in Boston, Lowell and Salem (which can only be occupied
by the elderly) since the market comparables upon which the
FMRs are determined in large part happen to be luxury units.
Another reason is the fact that most of the vacant structures
which are suitable for substantial rehabilitation happen to
be mid and high rise buildings which can only be occupied
by the elderly.
Several other aspects of the Section 8 program also help
explain the shift towards elderly housing, but in order of
significance these rank considerably below those of the FMR
impact on replacement costs, the restrictions of the elevator
clause, and the BSPRA on reducing equity and increasing long-
term profits. These factors include the following and have
less impact on the balance between elderly and family housing
production:
- The impact of the five percent higher FMR limit for elderly
developments is significant but not a compelling factor in
explaining the shift towards elderly housing. Although the
five percent differential can be capitalized and increases
the financial feasibility of a project, owners of MHFA financed
developments are limited to a six percent return on total equity,
and in most developments this return goes into operating re-
serves. The major benefit of the five percent differential
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then becomes that in which it permits sponsors to build more
quality and amenities into elderly developments and to inflate
the mortgage from which syndication proceeds are derived.
- The higher limit on the percentage of subsidized units
for elderly developments is another element which is not a
compelling force in explaining the shift towards elderly
housing. Since virtually all proposals for MHFA financing
and Section 8 rent subsidies assume that 100 percent of the
units will be subsidized, and neither HUD nor MHFA enforce
their stated objectives of promoting mixed income developments
by limiting the percentage of subsidized units in a family
development; the policy guideline which specifically allows
100 percent of the units in an elderly development to be sub-
sidized has, therefore, become less of an advantage to elderly
housing sponsors.
- Also, it can not be argued that the 20 percent bonus
FMR for large family units under the Section 8 Existing Hous-
ing Program might be reducing the level of family demand for
MHFA financed Section 8 SR/NC units. One has to conclude
that the utilization of the Section 8 Existing Program has
not provided enough housing units for family households in
need to justifiably reduce MHFA's production of family units.
In spite of the cost saving and mobility factor advantages of
using the Existing program to meet more of the remaining
family needs in Massachusetts--within current funding levels--
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it can not be said that the Existing program compensates for
MHFA's poor performance in financing family units.
- Finally, income eligibility criteria have no effect in
determining the shift from a balanced housing production to
one emphasizing mostly elderly housing production. Statistics
from HUD and the Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities
and Development show not only that the need among family
households exceeds the elderly housing need, but that the
much-talked-about increase in the number of elderly house-
holds in need of housing assistance is statistically small
and occurring at a very gradual rate (see Table 1 above).
The impact of the FMRs on leveraging mortgage funds,
the elevator clause, and the ten percent BSPRA thus rise to
the top among all aspects of the Section 8 program as program
elements which help explain the shift towards elderly housing.
PART III
THE IMPACT OF HOUSING MARKET AND INVESTMENT FORCES
OPERATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH MHFA's PROGRAM HISTORY
CHAPTER III
HOW SHIFTS IN THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM
AND OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING
MAY HAVE LED TO A SHIFT TOWARDS ELDERY HOUSING
Public Housing Occupancy Characteristics: National and State
Since the public housing program and other housing assist-
ance programs serve similar client income groups (see Table 11),
itis necessary to examine any possible shifts in the pub-
lic housing program that could account for some of the shift
in MHFA financed construction. At least hypothetically some
circumstances might exist which are either driving the eld-
erly out of public housing or uniquely catering to family
housing needs so that the MHFA would be looked to to compen-
sate for the shift in demand.
Table 11
INCOME CHARACTERISTICS OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS
IN CURRENT MAJOR HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN 1977
Section 8
New/Rehab
Median
Public
Housing
Median
Mean
Section
236
Mean
Rent
Suppmt.
Median House- $4,376 $3,691 $6,285 $3,544hold Income
Source: HUD Budget Office cited in G.A.0. Report to Congress,
Section 236 Rental Housing--An Evaluation, pg. 14.
On the national level since 1937 during its more than
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forty-year existence, only 1.1 million public housing units
have been built.1 Twenty-five percent were built specifically
for the elderly, but GAO estimates that nationally 42 per-
cent of public housing is occupied by elderly people as a
result of their low income,2 and in Massachusetts the per-
centage is estimated to be 36 percent3 (see Table 12 below).
Activity within the program over the past decade has
also been limited. In 1973 all capital programs for new
public housing construction were discontinued in the Nixon
moratorium; and, as reflected by only minimal funding levels
in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Congress
revealed its opposition to expanding the public housing pro-
'4
gram. Then again in 1978, despite the shortfall in federally
assisted housing for lower-income households under its own
ten-year housing goals; Congress provided no major initiatives
to spur new efforts in the Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1978. Rather than innovative, the 1978 Act
has been described as one that "sought to make the existing
housing programs work better."5
1. Arthur Solomon, 'Vederal Housing Policy: Background Pacer
on Recurring Policy Issues," pg. 93.
2. GAO Report, Section 236 Rental Housing: An Evaluation
with Lessons for the Future, Dg. 3.
3. E.O.C.D., Office of Policy, Planning, and Program Devel-
opment, Inventory of Subsidized Housing, 8 October 1980.
4. U.S. Congress, Select Committee on Aging, Housing for the
Elderly: The Federal Response, pg. 14-25.
5. NAHRO, "Overview of the Housing and Community Development
Amendments of 1978," May 1979, pg. 40.
-83-
Table 12
ELDERLY/FAMILY OCCUPANCY IN FEDERALLY AND STATE SUPPORTED
PUBLIC HOUSING IN MASSACHUSETTS THROUGH OCTOBER 1980
Elderly Family Total
Number of Units 64,790 116,075 180,865
Percentages 36 % 64 % 100 %
Source: E.O.C.D., Office of Policy, Planning, and Program
Development, Inventory of Subsidized Housing,
8 October 1980.
Perhaps what is behind the unwillingness of Congress to
expand the public housing program lies in the debate over
how to achieve racial integration both within projects and
within communities. One housing policy analyst claims:
strong opposition to housing integra-
tion and the placement of projects in
the suburbs could curtail public hous-
ing entirely. There is thus a tradeoff
between the level of integration which
is sought and the level of funding for
public housing which can be obtained
from Congress.
Given this attitude and the minimal funding from Con-
gress for public housing maintenance, it is unlikely that
the public housing program will grow to meet new needs or
old unmet needs of either family or elderly households.
1. S. B. Kame, "The Future of Public Housing," Real Estate
Law Journal, June 1978, pg. 59.
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Public Housing Policies and Tenant's Perceptions
To complete this review, however, it is necessary to look
not only at the shortfall in the growth of public housing--
but it is necessary to consider whether there are any forces
acting upon the current residents of public housing which might
lead to changes in the occupancy levels of either household
type. Such an investigation, in all likelihood, would reveal
that some shifts among the current residents of public housing
in Massachusetts is in progress. It is reported that there is
a growing fear among the elderly in public housing for their
personal safety, 1 and combined with the high level of satis-
faction and sense of security among elderly tenants in State
(HFA) financed developments,2 this could result in a shift in
the demand among elderly households.
Coupled with this as yet unmeasured factor is the fact
that 22 percent of public housing households consist of fami-
lies with five or more members as compared with only 6 percent
in Section 8 (MHFA) projects. 3 The household size/age charac-
teristic is an important factor in understanding the reasons
why elderly households may be trying to get out of public
housing, since one survey of housing preferences among the
elderly revealed that,
1. HUD Office of Policy Development, Crime in Public Housing:
A Review of Major Issues and Selected Crime Reduction
Strategies, December 1978, pg. iv.
2. Edward Sherman, Living Arrangements and Security Among the
Elderly: A Study, New York, Praeger Institute, June 1976.
3. Arthur Solomon,"Federal Housing Policy: Background Paoer On
Recurring Policy Issues," pg. 33.
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not one of the residents from age-segregated
buildings indicated that he wanted to move
from his current housing because of fear of
crime; 42 percent from age-integrated settings
said they wished to move. These responses are evi-
dence of more secure feelings of residents of
age-segregated buildings.1
Thus, to the extent that the elderly derive more satisfaction
from being in projects with more homogeneous household
age and size characteristics, then a shift in the preference
of elderly households to live in State HFA financed elderly
developments versus public housing is likely to be in pro-
cess.
As further evidence that a shift may be in process is
the fact that Congress increased from 10 to 15 percent the
proportion of single, non-elderly, non-disabled persons who
may occupy age-integrated public housing projects2 . One
likely reason for this is because the relative demand of
elderly households had fallen compared to the demand of non-
elderly households which had risen. Thus, as we examine
the reasons for the shift to elderly housing, it is concluded
that the decline in the role of public housing to provide as
acceptable a living environment for the elderly does bear on
the shift--but with regard to other forces which impact the
economics of subsidized housing, the role of public housing
1. Edward Sherman, Living Arrangements and Security Among
the Elderly: A Study, New York, Praeger Institute, June 1976.
2. U.S. Congress, 1978 Housing and Community Development Act
Amendments (P.L. 95-557) Title II, "Housing Assistance
Programs."
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is not a compelling reason for the shift.
Demographics and the Increase in Elderly Population Cohorts
In addition to housing programs and policies, it is
necessary to examine trends within the population that
translate into impacts on real estate and housing develop-
ment. Frieden and Solomon analyse six forces in an attempt
to forecast changes both in the actual number of households
and the net effect on the incidence of households 1 . Their
conclusions for the period of 1975-1985 are summarized in
the following:
1) Marital Status--the effect of later marriages which
tends to reduce the incidence of household formation is likely
to be offset by increases in the incidence of household
formation resulting from more divorces in the older popula-
tion group with an overall small positive net effect on
household incidence.
2) Family Size--large families will become far less common
in the next several years because birth rates have been
falling since the early 1960's. The average age at which
women bear their first child has also increased. The birth
rate was 96.6 in 1965, 87.9 in 1970, and 68.4 in 1974; an
overall decline of 42% since 1960. (The Statistical Abstract
of the U.S. 1976 and Census of the Population: 1970)
1. Frieden B. and A. Solomon, The Nation's Housing 1975-1985,
M.I.T.-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, April 1977,
Cambridge, MA pg. 31-39.
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3) Relatives--Through 1975, older adults had fewer and
fewer close relatives with whom to live as a result of the
historical fall in birth rates before 1940 1. After 1940,
the birth rates rose, and people who had children then
are now becoming elderly. Overall then, since "large num-
bers of the elderly who had so few children during the 1930s
are still alive," 2 the incidence of elderly households has
risen but is expected to level off in the near future.
4) Income and Wealth--While in the past the effect of the
growth of the average per capita income in constant dollars
was to push up the incidence of household formation; future
income changes may remain a positive factor, but are expected
to level off as the average per capita income in constant
dollars ceases to rise.
5) Household Separation--Since it is becoming more costly
for households to separate, this factor will tend to depress
the incidence of households in the future which is the re-
verse of the trend in the recent past.
6) Household-Housing Match--Mismatches in the supply
and demand of different unit types are starting to have a
negative effect on the incidence of households. Large
houses are in abundant supply because there are fewer large
families demanding them; while the middle sized housing units
1. Preston, Samuel H. "Family Sizes of Children and Family
Sizes of Women," Demography, 13, no. 1(1976), pg. 105-114.
2. Frieden and Solomon, The Nation's Housing 1975-1985, pg. 33
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required by small families are now falling into short supply
1because of demographic trends and low production
It is arguable then that a continued lower national
birthrate will result in increasing the relative proportion
of elderly to non-elderly households. Using this as leverage,
the advocates of elderly persons' issues and concerns will
have even more courage to argue that the elderly comprise
an increasing proportion of households in need--and thus a
shift to more elderly housing is justified. Such a view is
popularized by statements in the media such as the following:
The really big shift in demographics that
we foresee (in the 1980 census) is among the
elderly. In general life expectancy has been
stretching, and by 1980, the number of residents
who are older than 65 will make up about one-eighth
of the State's population. Such a shift is bound
to produce problems eventually for state programs
that support medical care, housing, and other bene-
fits for the elderly2 .
In reality, however, the increase in the percentage of
elderly households in Massachusetts in need relative to family
households since 1970 has been only 3 percent. The percentage
of elderly households in need has risen from 44 percent of
the total in 1970 to 47 percent in 1980. Therefore, the
elderly do represent an increasing proportion of the total
households in need; but the increase has been very gradual
and should not be used to rationalize a continued shortage
in the production of family units.
1. Current Housing Reports, "Annual Housing Surcey," Final
Report H-150-74A (1976).
2. Robert Danley, Massachusetts Department of PubLic Health,
quoted in "Waiting to See What the Census Will Show"
Boston Globe, 30 March 1980
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Unmet housing needs among low and moderate income
family households still account for over 184,000 units
(see Table 1 reprinted below); so regardless of the recent
or impending increase in elderly housing needs, family hous-
ing needs should not be forgotten.
Table 1 (Repeated)
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS WHO QUALIFY
FOR RENTAL ASSISTANCE AND PUBLIC HOUSING (1970,1978, and 1980)
Needs Elderly Family Total
As of Jan. 1, 1970 208,290 (44%) 260,249 (56%) 468,539 (100%)
As of Jan. 1, 1978 162,693 (46%) 187,264 (54%) 349,957 (100%)
As of Jan. 1, 1980 161,960 (47%) 184,370 (53%) 346,330 (100%)
Source: E.O.C.D. Office of Policy, Planning, and Program
Development, Housing Needs in Massachusetts, 8 Oct. 1980
It is important to remember, however, that because the
distribution of subsidized housing is such a political
issue--even the perception that the proportion of needy
elderly households has risen could be sufficient to assure
that policy changes benefitting the cause of family housing
are not enacted.
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The elderly in this country now comprise a respected
political force; and since they are generally perceived by
lawmakers and the public as among the most deserving
of the poor, anyone who opposes elderly issues "often
finds himself perceived as against God, motherhood, and
1,,patriotism
Furthermore, the elderly have had a special staff
within the Department of Housing and Urban Development re-
served for overseeing that that federal government does not
neglect their concerns2 .
1. Ronal Derven, "Housing for Who?" Buildings, September
1976, pp. 62-68.
2. Jane Bloom, Assistant Secretary of HUD for Elderly Affairs
"1972 is Shaping Up as a Big Year for the Elderly,"
Journal of Housing, September 1972.
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With this kind of attention at the federal level,
and a growing body politic, we can be confident that
any efforts by HUD or the MHFA to vindicate the cause
of family housing at the expense of provisions which
benefit the elderly will be met with widespread
opposition.
Conclusions
As we examine the reasons for the shift to elderly
housing, it is concluded that the decline in the role
of public housing to provide an acceptable living en-
vironment for the elderly to a limited extent does in-
crease their demand for housing. Likewise the total
increase from 1976 to 1980 of three percent among eld-
erly households in need of housing assistance also adds
to the prominence and the popularity of doing elderly
housing. Compared to the higher ability of elderly
developments to leverage mortgage financing from higher
FMR's; and to the increased tax shelter and capital
gains opportunities associated with the larger and
more costly elderly developments; the role of public
housing and demographic changes, however, are not compel-
ling reasons for the shift.
Furthermore, the strong opposition to housing inte-
gration and the placement of projects in the suburbs could
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even further reduce the effectiveness of public housing
to provide an acceptable living environment. It appears
that Congress is unwilling to fund capital programs to ex-
pand the public housing inventory, and unless widespread
rehabilitation of existing units occurs, many of the units
which have been built will no longer provide housing for the
elderly.
Also, as long as the perception persists in the minds
of elderly people that public housing is unsafe, there is
going to be a preference among the elderly to live in State
HFA financed units. Elderly preference, however, as previous-
ly stated is not a compelling reason for the shift in MHFA's
housing production under Section 8 away from family units.
CHAPTER IV
HOW THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE MHFA SPONSORS FURTHER INFLUENCE PROGRAM UTILIZATION
Types of Sponsors
Three types of sponsors are allowed to participate
in HUD housing subsidy programs, and each type does so
for different reasons.
1) Cooperative sponsored housing is owned by the
occupants with each household having one share in the
ownership and a voice in the management of the development;
2) Non-profit sponsors, typically a church group, vol-
unteer service group, or other organization receives mort-
gage financing to cover 100 percent of the development cost,
but along with cooperatives receive no profit; and
3) Limited dividend sponsors typically consist of a
private developer or investment company. In exchange for
a 90 percent mortgage, the sponsor agrees that the annual
return on his original 10 percent paper equity will be no
higher than 6 percent.
Under the Section 236 program, the non-profit and
cooperative sponsors comprised a disproportionate share
of project failures compared with the record of limited
dividend sponsors (see Table 5 above). These failures
were the result of lack of experience and limited financial
resources in the non-profit or cooperatively sponsored
1. GAO Report, Section 236 Rental Housing: An Evaluation
with Lessons for the Future, pg. 14
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projects which contributed to management problems and made it
difficult to meet unexpected expenses during construction or
operation'. In contrast with the Section 236 experience in
which 71 percent of all projects were sponsored by the limit-
ed dividents, 88 percent of Section 8 developments are sim-
2ilarly sponsored2. The main reason for this change is be-
cause of legislative changes enacted in the H.&C.D. Act of
1974, in which sponsors became responsible for selecting the
sites, obtaining control of the site, designing the develop-
ment's characteristics and having a highly skilled develop-
3ment team in place . With greater responsibility and the de-
mand for more capital resources, fewer non-profit and cooper-
ative housing sponsors have been able to participate in Sec-
tion 8. Another element of responsibility that was shifted
onto the sponsor under the Section 8 program was the result
of FHA insurance being much less available. This meant that
if the development ever foreclosed, both the general partner
and his passive investors would loose their entire investment,
any outstanding syndication proceeds, and face a tax liabil-
ity on "the difference between the still high mortgage bal-
ance at the time of foreclosure and the sharply reduced tax
4,,basis of the property
The remainder of this chapter will, therefore, deal with
the forces (cash flow, tax benefits and futures) which encourage
limited dividend sponsors to favor doing elderly housing.
1. Ibid.
2. GAO Report, Evaluation of Alternatives for Financing, pg. 101
3. Ibid.
4. J.M. Blew and H.H. Stevenson, "How to Understand a Subsidized
Housing Syndication," Real Estate Rev., 8 Summer 1978, pg.42-51.
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Process of Obtaining Local Permits
Perhaps the most sensitive aspect of doing a subsidized
housing project from the sponsor's perspective is the pro-
cess of dealing with local health, engineering, zoning and
appeals boards. These boards have the responsibility of ad-
ministering state and locally determined land use controls
established for the public health, safety and welfare of the
community. Many communities, however, quite naturally consid-
er the fiscal impacts of growth in their view of public
purpose and seek to limit development to that which will
generate the most revenue and require the lowest level of
public services.
Further research would be required before serious quan-
titative estimates of Section 8's fiscal effects could be
attempted, but the most widely accepted view among local
officials and taxpayers is that housing for low and moderate
income families with school-aged children is the least desire-
1
able in terms of its fiscal impact . On the other hand, hous-
ing for the elderly is generally perceived as having positive
fiscal impacts, since they are perceived as being the furthest
removed from local school budgets-- traditionally a central
concern of cost-revenue analyses for new housing projects 2.
Little, however, is known about the impact of increasing con-
centrations of the elderly on local expenditures for health
1. Interfaith Housing Corporation, Housing in the Suburbs,pg.12.
2. Kingsley and Both, Pilot Urban Impact Analysis (Sec.8),pg.59.
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care, transportation and special recreation services.
Their needs in these areas are surely higher than the aver-
age ; but quantitatively it is unknown how much higher, and
it is not the purpose of this thesis to perform such an an-
alysis (see Appendix #1).
In addition to the control that localities possess
through land use regulations per se, the Section 8 regu-
lations themselves have given local governments greater
control over the type of housing which can be built, its
location, and who it will serve2 . Section 8 subsidies
are prohibited for use except in accordance with the
local government's Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) and are
indeed contingent on the existence of such a plan. This
was not the case when Section 236 commitments were being made
and some view it as an all too effective tool for localities
to avoid economic and racial integration.
HUD anticipated this difficulty and constructed an
elaborate system of checks and balances designed to avoid
placing projects in areas of minority concentration or
significantly changing the racial mix in a given area while
at the same time promoting economic integration. The theory
is that if low income households are dispersed among house-
1. "Waiting to See What Census Will Show: Elderly Popula-
tion Shift Expected," Boston Globe, 30 March 1980.
2. GAO Report, Section 236 Rental Housing: An Evaluation
With Lessons for the Future, pg. 140.
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holds of greater means, the social problems diminish.
It is analagous to the idea that coals in a fire burn more
intensely when together but die out when dispersed.
To prevent localities from inhibiting dispersion of the
poor, HUD staff also spend a great deal of time reviewing
the needs and objectives stated in these local HAPs and
quite often when compared with census data, the needs of
low and moderate income families and minorities are under-
represented while elderly housing needs are overstated
Evidence that sponsors of family housing developments
have good reasons to fear the costs of obtaining local per-
mits is suggested by a 1978 task force report that up to 20
percent of the cost of housing is due to the time and effort
2
spent getting local permits2. While this estimate may be
high, the real impact of local resistance in cases where it
does become fully mobilized against a particular project can
be fatal. One sponsor group's experience is reflected in
the following description:
In its four-year existence, IHC has been severely
limited by the practives of local governments in
suburban communities. It has suffered capricious
zoning, planning, and taxation decisions in commun-
ities bent on thwarting a particular housing project.
In some instances, these practices were employed be-
cause the community wanted to preserve its single-
family residential character, in some instances
because the community feared the financial and social
burden of an influx of large poor families, and, in
some instances, because egonomic and social bigotry
persisted in the community3.
1. Ed Hick, GAO Policy Analyst, interview, 30 June 1980.
2. HUD, Task Force on Housing Costs' Final Report, May 1978.
3. Interfaith Housing Corporation, The Suburban Noose: pg. 6.
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A more balanced view of the effect of local permitting
on the development of family and elderly housing is reflected
in the analysis of Elisabeth Ruben and Constance Williams
in Comprehensive Permits: For Housing Lower Income House-
Holds in Massachusetts. Their results reveal that from
1974 through 1979, 111 applications for comprehensive per-
mits were made with local boards of appeal statewide under
the provisions of Chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969. Of the
35 applications that resulted in construction 11 were for
families and 17 were for elderly households. But the really
significant aspect of their reserach revelaed that the pro-
portion of the units proposed for families that were built
was 16%; the similar percentage for elderly housing was
29%; and for mixed family and elderly housing, the percent
1built was 32%
Based on their analysis it was concluded,
that the effort needed to get a comprehensive permit
and carry work through to construction is not easy,
and opposition to housing for families has been
greater than for housing for older people 2 .
It was also concluded that a gradual change in the re-
sponse of local appeals boards to all subsidized multi-family
housing proposals has evolved in recent years.
In the early years of Chapter 774 many localities
refused all multi-family housing proposals; then
in the middle years there was a mixed experience;
and in more recent years the most common thing to
happen is for the locality to approve proposals only
1. Elisabeth Ruben and Constance Williams, Comprehensive
Permits, Boston, CHPA, December 1979, pg. 2
2. ibid. pg. 10
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1after negtiations and imposing limiting conditions
From the developer's view, however, despite both pos-
itive and negative implications cited by Ruben and Williams;
the process of proposing and constructing family housing
within the local framework is still more difficult than for
elderly housing. A thorough review, delays and possibly
legal challenges is only the beginning; the financial burden
of these conflicts is high and can become the catalyst for
2the failure of a project
In the event that such conflicts cause time delays,
additional funds are needed to carry the construction loan
for a longer period of time, and the only source of addition-
al funds would be either by income generated from units
which have been completed (in a phased development) or by
additional sponsor investment. For our typical 220 unit
family development with a construction loan of $8,459,352
at an 8f interest rate 3 , the sponsor would pay $56,182/month
in just interest for the estimated 12-18 month period of time
before occupancy. Any delay which extended the construction
period interest payments and delayed rent-up would increase
the risk of default. It is no wonder then that sponsors of
Section 8 housing view the process of obtaining local permits
1. Constance Williams, formerly of CHPA, interview, 25 Nov. 1980
2. HUD Multi-Family Defaults Before Final Endorsement, June
1974, pg. 3
3. See Figure 3 above.
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for family developments with great caution. If additional
funds are needed because of a delay at the local level and
there are not any units ready for occupancy, the sponsor
has no one to turn to but himself to come up with money to
pay interest and debt service.
The Psychological Identification Process
Developer preferences also explain some of the emphasis
on the participation of elderly households in Section 8.
Most eligible elderly households are white. Many
were middle income for most of their lives. They did
not live through a culture of poverty; they just hap-
pen now to have low incomes1.
This suggests that developers see the elderly as people
like themselves who will maintain their units and pay their
rent on time. It is understandable that just as people tend
to be most comfortable in familiar surroundings, they also
prefer to develop associations with people who most nearly
hold to their cultural, economic and social values. Low
and moderate income families who are economically disadvan-
taged would tend to have very little socially or economically
in common with the entrepeurnurial developer types who spon-
sor Section 8 housing. One exists in a "culture of poverty"
while the other's mind is set on how ingenuity, hard work
and "the system" have produced so many rewards for him.
1. Thomas Kingsley and Deborah Both, RAND Corp., Pilot Urban
Impact Analysis: HUD's Section 8 NC/SR Program, August
1979, pg. 34.
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The elderly share much more in common with the psycho-
logical framework of a developer. Their earlier years were
not known for government programs which allowed millions
to become dependent on charity, and the axiom that America
was the land of opportunity was still good currency. And,
despite the average income of Section 8's elderly occupants
being only $3,701 in 1978 compared to non-elderly incomes
which averaged $5,537, it should be noted that the accumu-
lated assets of elderly low-income households are typically
much greater than those of non-elderly households at the
same income level'.
Developer preferences are, therefore, a force to be
acknowledged, and considerable evidence is provided below
to show that the majority of proposals and successfully finan-
ced projects are for elderly housing.
Table 13
DISTRIBUTION OF MHFA PROPOSALS: YEAR ENDING MAY 16,1980
Elderly Small Family Large Family.
(1.0-1.29) (1.3-1.89) (1.9 and over)
Ave. BR* Ave. BR* Ave. BR* Total
In Process 61 (67%) 26 (29%) 4 ( 4%) 91 (100%)
Committed 14 (70%) 5 (25%) 1 ( 5%) 20 (100%)
Rejected 25 (57%) 17 (39%) 2 ( 4%) 44 (100%)
Dropped 12 (35%) 14 (41%) 8 (24%) 34 (100%)
Withdrawn _ 6 (46%) 2 (16%) _1 (100%)
Total 117 (58%) ~68 (34%) 17 ( 8%) 202 (100%)
* Ave. BR means the average bedroom size per unit over the
entire development.
Source: Compiled by the Author from Kirk McClure, memo,
Proposals Year Ending May 16, 1980
1. Ibid.
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In terms of just the number of proposals, the elderly
accounted for 58 percent of all proposals submitted to MHFA-
but they accounted for 70 percent of all project commitments.
Another dimension to the psychological indentification
process-that suggests the developer's preference for elderly
projects leads to an even greater unit imbalance (than 70%
elderly and 30% family)--is given by the fact that elderly projects
are typically developed at greater density than family housing
(see Figure 9 above).
Developer preferences are, therefore, a significant force
to be acknowledged in explaining the shift to elderly housing;
but how much of their preference is a preference purely from a
psychological/social viewpoint versus how much of the preference
is really the result of pure and straight-forward financial
advantages to the developer himself is an interesting question.
The closing section of this chapter presents insights into ex-
actly how these financial incentives operate and how these incen-
tives are probably by far the most compelling forces in explain-
ing the shift to elderly housing.
Introduction to Equity Syndication and Tax Benefits
Federal housing policy consists of two basic approaches;
1) direct spending programs, which serve only a fraction of
the eligible population, and 2) housing related tax incentives
-103-
which are qvailable to everyone who meets their criteria of
eligibility. One difference between these two approaches is
that while direct spending programs can be strictly regulated,
government housing policy makers are much less able to control
how investors and actors in the private market will utilize the
tax incentives. The shift towards elderly housing under the
Section 8 program is an example of how the private sector makes
selective use of tax incentives to their own satisfaction--
and in the process have created a dramatic imbalance to-
wards construction of housing for the elderly.
To begin to understand who it is that makes use of these
federal tax incentives and why they are so selective, the income
characteristics of two major housing related tax expenditures
are given in the following table.
Table 14
DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS OF MAJOR
HOUSING RELATED TAX INCENTIVES BY INCOME OF BENEFICIARY
Annual Income
Class of Taxpayer
0-$9,999
I10,000 to $19,999
.320,999 to $29,000
S30,000 to $49,999
50,000 to $99,999
$100,000 and over
Revenue loss in $M.
Accelerated Favorable Treatment
Depreciation for Construction
for Rental Period Interest
Housing and Taxes
2.2 2.0
3.4 3.3
3-8 4.0
15-0 14.7
22.8 22.7
(32.9 
15.100 % 100 0
(320) (150)
Source: CBO Tax Analysis Division, Special Analyses of the
Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 1979, pg. 158-160
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Notice that over half of all the benefits accrue to tax-
payers whose annual income is $100,000 and over. This is in
sharp contrast with homeownership tax provisions which more
directly aid the occupant of the housing, and it suggests
that rental housing tax provisions benefit the developer
primarily and the renter secondarily, if at all'.
It is also necessary to put rental housing tax provisions
in perspective, since the sponsor's desire to maximize the
potential tax benefits of a development is the single most
important factor in his decision to propose housing for fam-
ilies or the elderly. Three components of the federal tax
laws have an especially strong impact on the sponsor's invest-
ment decision, and the following is an overview of how each
tax provision is utilized to maximize the total benefits.
Accelerated Depreciation and the Sale of Tax Shelters
Sponsors of low income rental housing depend upon the
sale of tax shelters through equity syndication more than
anything else to enhance their overall financial benefits.
The way it works is that sponsors of new and rehabilitated
rental housing depreciate the depreciable basis of the units
at rates that involve deductions in the early years as much
as twice those available to investors in other income-pro-
ducing assets (see Table 15 below). The depreciable basis is
figured by taking total "development costs," subtracting land
1. Arthur Solomon,"Federal Housing Policy"' pg. 66
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(leaving total "replacement cost"), then subtracting construc-
tion period interest and taxes. For our typical development,
the depreciable basis can be figured as follows.
Total Replacement Cost $9,399,280 Taxes
Minus Taxes 165,000 (220 units x $500/unit)
Minus Interest 1,015,12 x (1.5 years)
Depreciable Basis $8,219,158 $165,000
Interest
(8% of $8,459,352)
x (1.5 years)
$1,015,122
One depreciation method is known as the 200% double de-
clining balance method. This is available to investors in
new subsidized housing stock and will be utilized in the
figures which follow to represent the annual depreciation
benefits for sponsors of family housing. Most family housing
is new construction, so this is appropriate. On the other
hand, a more favorable depreciation treatment is available to
investors who acquire existing structures and rehabilitate
them into subsidized housing. In these cases, the expenses
incurred in rehabilitating rental units for lower income
households (most often elderly occupied) may be fully amor-
tized within eight years (in 1980). This was the result of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 which amended Sec. 167 (K) of the
1969 TRA so that in 1978 the five-year amortization period
began to increase by one year each year until the depreciation
period becomes equal to ten years. This is available only
Table 15
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION BENEFITS BY VARIOUS METHODS
OVER FORTY YEARS FOR SPONSORS OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING: DEPRECIABLE BASIS M82199158
Year Straight
Line
8 Years
Straight
Line
33 1/3
Years
Double
Declining
Balance
33 1/3 Years*
Year Straight
Line
8 Years
Straight
Line
33 1/3
Years
Double
Declining
Balance
33 1/3 Years*
)1,027,395
)1,027,395)1,027,395
>1,027,395
1,027,395
11,027,395
'1,027,395
11,027,395
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$246,599
$246,599
0246,599
'246,599
q246,599
$246,599
246,599
4246,599
%246,599
246,599
$246,599
.246,599
246,599
#246,599
A246,599
$246,599t246,599
$246,599
3246,599$246,599
$493,149
3463,560
S435,747
.409,602
3385,026
361,924
3340,208
I319,796
300,609
282,572
1265,618
0249,681
$234,700
%220 , 618
V207,380
,194,994
'183,241
,172,246
T161,192
152,198
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
o 246,599
O %246,599
O 3246,599
O 0246,599
O 3246,599
0 V246,599
O '246,599
O 3246,599
0 "246,599
O 9246,599
O '246,599
O '246,599
O 1246,599
0 81,378
O 0
O 0
O 0
O 0
O 0
O 0
Total $8,219,158 $8,219,158
$143,066
i134,482
q126,413
%118,828
$111 ,699
104,996
% 98,697
T 92,775
" 87,208
$ 81,976
77,057
72,433
68,088
64,oo3
60,163
56,553
53,160
49,970
46,972
44,153
$8,219,158
Source: Compiled by the Author.
* "Under the declining-balance method the book value of an asset never reaches zero;
consequently, when the asset is sold, exchanged or scrapped, any remaining book
value is used in determining the capital gain or loss." (Pyle and White, Fundamental
Accounting Principles, seventh ed. 1975, Homewood Illinois, pg. 313.
0
1
2
3
4
56
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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to investors in rehab and will be utilized in the figures
which follow to represent the annual depreciation benefits
for sponsors of elderly housing. Most rehab activity is
for the elderly, so this is appropriate.
The difference in tax shelters which profit-motivated
developers can realize, however, (despite there being no
intention to favor investments in the tax laws per se),
can only be approximated with the help of certain assump-
tions. The following setup represents the first year tax
losses that are available given:
- a high rise elevated rehabilitated structure for the
elderly,
- a three story new walkup building for families,
- each development consists of 220 units, and
- the replacement cost excluding land is $9,399,280.
The reason why a rehabilitated structure is used in
this illustration for an elderly development is because
the volume of rehab activity in recent years has steadily
1grown , and the vast majority of rehab activity is intended
2for elderly occupants2. These rehabilitated structures
cannot be occupied by family households because most re-
useable structures (schools, factories, office buildings
and parking garages) are mid and high rise and require
elevators which are forbidden for use by families with
children.
1. MHFA, Housing List, February 1980
2. Ibid.
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Figure 14
ELDERLY VS. FAMILY FIRST YEAR TAX LOSS ANALYSIS
Elderly Family
Interest*
Points
Maintenance and Other
Operating Costs
Depreciation
Total Deductions
Minus Gross Rental
Revenue*
Size of Tax Shelter
Generated
$(674,186)
(5,200)
(614,900)
(1 ,027,395)**
(2,321,681)
1,609y776
$ 711,905
$(674,186)
(5,200)
(707,520)
(493,149)***
(1,880,055)
1,521,672
$ 358,383
* See Figure 3 above.
** An eight-year straight line depreciation period for rehabil-
itated structures (see Table 15 above).
*** A 40-year 200 percent double-declining balance method for
new structures (see Table 15 above) .
Source: Compiled by author.
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Sponsor's Equity Syndication Proceeds
The difference in the elderly ($711,905)* versus family
($358,383) first year tax losses becomes an even greater
factor in explaining the shift to elderly housing when we
examine the syndication process in which the sponsor can
realize great profits through the sale of tax shelters1 .
Most sponsors do not have high enough incomes to optimize
the use of these shelters2 , so they form limited partner-
ships through
1. Anthony Yudis, "Some are Still Interested in Low-Income
Housing," Boston Globe 19 July 1980
2. GAP Report, Section 236 Rental Housing: An Evaluation
With Lessons for the Future, Ch. 3
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which the sponsor (the general partner) makes money selling
tax shelters to persons or corporations with much greater
incomes (passive investors) that need sheltering. Each
dollar of book loss can reduce the investor's current taxes
on other income by an amount varying up to and no more than
50 cents for a corporation and as high as 70 cents for an
individual. Accordingly, many housing projects today are
directly owned either by corporations, by individuals
or by partnerships.
As a rule of thumb the subsidized housing industry
prices the sponsors' ten percent equity share for sale ac-
cording to a percentage of the mortgage which increases as
the first year losses increase and the risk of financial
trouble decreases. They can sell the shares for between 15
to 25 percent of the mortgage value for newly built subsi-
dized housing, and between 25 to 35 percent of the mortgage
value for rehabilitated historic structures. 2 Since rehabili-
tated structures are often limited to elderly occupancy and
the risk of financial trouble with elderly housing is mini-
mized due to the 100 percent subsidy ceiling and the five
percent FMR differential (see Chapter 2), the preference of
sponsors to do housing for the elderly is to be expected. On
the other hand, one wonders why sponsors seem cautious about
proposing family developments when there is still a profit
1. Kirk McClure, MHFA Mortgage Officer, Boston, Massachusetts,
written correspondence, 12September 1980.
2. John Blake, Executive Director, MHFA, MHFA Conference,
Park Plaza Hotel, Boston, Massachusetts, 12 October 1980.
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to be made through the sale of tax shelters.
The explanation is that current syndication practices
hold the sponsor accountable to the limited partners for
a period of two to four years to provide security that the
development's operating costs do not rise faster than rental
income. This is accomplished by paying the sponsor his
syndication proceeds on an installment basis; so it is in
the sponsor's absolute interest to produce a development
that is as trouble-free as he can make it. Since elderly
1
housing meets this criterion much better than family housing
only with elderly housing will the sponsor have the great-
est confidence of receiving his full syndication proceeds
and profits.
For example, an attempt to estimate the sponsor's
equity syndication proceeds reveals the following in Figure
15 below.
1. GAO Report, Evaluation of Alternatives for Financing Low
and Moderate Income Rental Housing, pg. iv.
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Figure 15
ESTIMATE OF SPONSOR'S EQUITY SYNDICATION PROCEEDS
Elderly Family
Number of Units...............
Average Construction Costs/
Unit, Excluding Land.......
Subtotal................
Plus 10 Percent BSPRA .........
Replacement Cost...........
10 Percent Owner's Equity.....
90 Percent MHFA Financing.....
Sale of Tax Shelters..........
Gross Sponsor Syndication
Income..................
Syndication Fees***...........
Net Syndication Income........
220 .....
$38,840
8,544,800
854,480
9,399,280
939,928
8,45
2,96
3
2,6
220
.... .. $38,840
-.... 8,544,800
854,480
..... 9,399,280
9,352 -... 8,459,352
x .35*.... x .254
0,773 2,114,838
38,374 ..... 338,374
22,399..... -.1,776,464
* Based on eight-year straight line depreciation for
rehabilitated historic structures.
** Based on 200 percent double declining balance for newly
built subsidized housing.
*** Approximately four percent of the mortgage value.
Source: Compiled by the author.
. . . - -
.....0
**
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Equity Appreciation as a Function of the Qualities
of Amenities, Siting, and Length of Ownership
The difference in the elderly ($2,622,399) versus
family ($1,776,t464) equity syndication proceeds is of course a re-
flection of the assumptions and the different methods of
figuring yearly depreciation (see Table 15 above). Each
method has its advantages and disadvantages from the in-
vestcrs' viewpoint; and even the length of time that an in-
vestor would choose to hold onto a piece of property varies
with such factors as:
1) whether he would be in a higher or lower tax bracket
in the future;
2) whether the property is likely to appreciate or depre-
ciate due to neighborhood conditions;
3) whether he plans to build up or liquidate his real
estate holdings; and
4) whether any unusual cash flow risks are associated with
the particular kind of tenants that occupy the property.
In Figure 14 above, the respective depreciation schedules
were selected to represent elderly vs. family first year tax
losses after taking into consideration the above four factors.
Most structures that are suitable for rehabilitation are at
least three stories high. and are, therefore, limited to
occupancy by elderly households. 2 These properties are also
1. Telephone interview with I.R.S.Agent, June 23, 1980.
2. U. S. Congress, Housing and Community Development Act
of 1977, "Lower-Income Housing Assistance," Section 8,(c) (1), Stat. 88-663.
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usually located in areas of rising property values; so it
is most profitable to the investors to take the quickest
write-off which maximizes the shelter of other income and
then hold onto the property for some years after that to
maximize the capital gain. Since the elderly are not known
to be hard on rental property, and the Section 8 FMR schedules
favor the elderly anyway,2 investors tend to view longer
term ownership as being a good prospect. 3
The investment decision concerning family developments'
is quite different. Because of the uncertainties surrounding
4.
the cash flow and operating expenses, investors tend to
view these investments with more caution. Prepayment of the
MHFA mortgage is prohibited in less than 20 years;5 and
operating expenses for family developments are a higher-risk
variable, so developers are more reluctant to propose family
housing. When they do, the problem of less-than-ample cash
flows could lead to delayed maintenance and overlooking cap-
ital improvements. Also since local givernments are often
unwilling, to give new multi-family housing priority locations, 6
1. Thomas Kingsley and Deborah Both, RAND Corp., Pilot Urban
Impact Analysis: HUD's Section 8 NC/SR Program, Ch. 5.
2. See Table 8 above.
3. For example, see Figure 15 below and accompanying note.
4. See Figure 3 above.
5. MHFA Mortgage Security Agreement, Sec. 3.
6. Interfaith Housing Corporation Housing in the Suburbs, pg.6
-115 -
EXAMPLE OF WHY ELDERLY DEVELOPMENTS ARE GOOD LONG TERM INVESTMENTS
Figure 16
,&~ k
>~~.44"
A''
.9 -~ N
J"* .4~. )
.~t
Tabor Mill Company has begun construction on Taber Mill Apart-
ments, a 151-unit housing development for the elderly on Deane
Street. It is a conversion of a vacant mill building in
a stable older neighborhood of New Bedford.
Source: Boston Globe, March 30, 1980.
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and because the demand for developable suburban sites suit-
able for family housing would tend to make large acreage
sites more costly and scarce, the Section 8 family develop-
ments which are built might have a tendency to locate on
sites that are less likely than elderly developments to
appreciate in value.
IRS Recapture Provision
Another crucial element of the tax laws which should
be an integral part of every investor's decision of whether
to invest in subsidized housing is the recapture provision.
Owners of subsidized projects who consider selling or who
are forced to sell vis-a-vis a mortgage default must face
the IRS recapture provisions which reflect the legislative
policy that accelerated depreciation should be used to en-
courage investment in subsidized housing; but upon the sale
of the property, the government should recapture some of the
advantage which the owner received, during his ownership.
The advantage which the government chooses to recapture
is the excess of accelerated depreciation deductions over
straight line deductions, and the recapture rate is 100
percent minus 1 percent for each full month the property
is held beyond 100 months from the date placed in service
1.Stevenson, Howard H. and William J. Poorvu, Notes on
Taxation, p. 33, Harvard Business School, 9-379-192,
July 1979, available from Inter-Collegiate Case Clearing
House, Boston, MA
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The effect this has on sponsors is that it is likely
to reinforce the already favorable financial aspects of
doing rehab which is often limited to elderly tenants.
One reason is that the excess depreciation. attainable through
the eight-year straight line method (associated with elderly
housing) far exceeds that possible from the 200 percent
double-declining balance (associated with family housing).
The second reason is that because elderly tenants tend to
be less abusive of property, the sponsors of elderly housing
experience less real property depreciation.
Sponsors of family developments on the other hand re-
ceive lower excess depreciation benefits; and if for any
reason they decide to sell in less than 17 years, the spon-
sors are faced with the situation of having to treat the
recapture amount as taxable income.
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Conclusions
By now we should have a much better appreciation of how
federal tax incentives and tax laws have such a powerful
influence on the decisions of Section 8 sponsors. We
know that Section 8 sponsors are motivated to selectively
utilize the federal tax provisions in a way that will in-
crease the profitability of rental housing as an invest-
ment. What we do not know is the extent, if any, to which
these tax provisions reduce rents and the overall costs of
development. The net effect of these provisions may be
simply to increase the profitability of rental housing
as an investment (and to bid up development costs) as more
investors compete for a limited number of investment
opportunities.' The effect of this higher competition is
to put additional pressure on the Section 8 sponsor to
produce a bigger asset which will generate the greatest
investment opportunity--and the only way he can do that is
by proposing the biggest and most costly development.
The potential of family developments to generate
prosperous investment opportunities tends to be limited,2
so elderly developments with more amenities and larger
units are the way that sponsors seek to meet the higher demand.
1. Arthur Solomon, "Federal Housing Policy Background Pacer
on Recurring Policy Issues," pg. 42.
2. See Figure 3 above.
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Clearly the most important aspect of being a MHFA
sponsor centers around the process of equity syndication
and the resultant profitability of developing subsidized
housing. With more of the risk and responsibility
for developing subsidized housing being shifted onto
the shoulders of private sponsors and investors, most
actors in the development process prefer the least risky
and the most prudent investment strategies.
As one experienced developer/sponsor stated in
testimony before the House of Representatives' Committee
on Government Operations,
Developers and investors are building
these Section 8 projects to be viable
for sale once the depreciation and
tax benefits wear out, and if subsi-
dized tenants cannot be found. We
feel that the amenities are very im-
portant for the long term basis. In
the Section 8 projects as everybody
knows, the market right now is strong.
This is strictly a decision we make on
each project, and it's obviougly moti-
vated for our own protection.
Thus, there is a relationship between federal income
tax laws and the motives of sponsors who build larger and
more expensive units of elderly housing to meet the in-
crease in demand for investment opportunities. It is a
relationship that is based on the desire for profits and
1. Asbury D. Snow, quoted from U.S. Congress, House, Section 8
Leased Housing Assistance Program, Committee on Government
Operations, hearings, 95th Congress, pp. 300-01.
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bigger tax shelters; and it is much more likely to be
satisfied through the process of developing elderly
rather than family housing.
PART IV
THE IMPACT OF MHFA'S GOALS AND POLICIES
ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF ELDERLY AND FAMILY UNITS
CHAPTER V
A BUSINESS LENDING INSTITUTION WITH A PUBLIC PURPOSE
The Legislative Mandate
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) was
signed into law on September 8, 1966, and a brief statement
of its public purpose and legislative mandate is contained
in the following. The MHFA was established to finance
housing "which persons and families of low income, elderly
persons, and veterans can afford." (Section 2, Ch. 708 of
the Acts of 1966.) It was also established to serve a
public purpose;
Since the continued inadequacy of the
supply of low-income housing results
in the continued consequences of dis-
ease, crime, injuries, retardation of
education, and high costs for munici-
pal services, such as welfare, police,
and fire protection. (Section 2)
According to these statements it is clear that the
legislative mandate to the MHFA originally was and con-
tinues to be for the production of housing which both low
income family and elderly households can afford. Both types
of households need and deserve support, yet the economic
and legislative incentives of recent years have made it
very difficult for the MHFA to fulfill its mission.
In the previous chapters of this thesis various incen-
tives of lesser and greater significance have been examined
to discover their impact on the recent shift towards elderly
housing; and several of these incentives seem to be quite
compelling. The effect of the higher amount of BSPRA with
-122-
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elderly developments and its capacity to reduce actual cash
equity is by itself a very significant factor. A more
secure cash flow and the possibility of reaping rather
large sums through the sale of tax shelters on elderly
rehab developments is also a very compelling factor. Other
factors such as community opposition to family developments,
the management variable, and the psychological identifica-
tion process together contribute to the lack of interest
in family housing.
MHFA's Decision-making Environment
Finally, however, it is necessary to examine the role
that the leadership at MHFA, their development policies and
financial goals play in explaining the shift towards elderly
housing. Despite the legislative mandate which encourages a
balance between family and elderly housing, it would be in-
accurate to assume that MHFA's policies have a neutral effect
while forces from every other direction favor the shift to-
wards elderly housing.
MHFA's governing framework consists of a Board of Directors
and an Advisory Committee. The Board consists of seven members:
1) The commissioner of Commerce and Development,
2) The commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, ex
officius, and
3) Five gubenatorial appointees:
a) one experienced in mortgage banking,
b) one experienced in real estate transactions,
c) one experienced in architecture or city or
regional planning, and
d) two at-large appointees.
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To assist the Board in the discharge of its duties,
the Governor appoints from among interested citizens of the
Commonwealth an Advisory Committee of 15 persons, including
persons with experience or training in urban renewal,
building, social work, mortgage financing, the municipal
bond market, architecture, land use planning, and municipal
government. It is the role of.the advisory committee to
assist the MHFA and its staff in formulating policies and
procedures dealing with site selection, tenant selection,
rent levels, design objectives, and other questions relevant
to the MHFA's underlying goal of providing housing for low-
income households and attaining balanced, attractive commun-
ities.
In trying to understand MHFA's decision-making environ-
ment it is best to review the circumstances and events in which
they operate. The MHFA has been described as a "business
lending institution with a public purpose,"' but the extent
to which they operate like a business versus the public pur-
pose of their mandate has varied over time. Prior to 1976
and the New York City's default on their municipal bonds
(when the national mood was still supportive of public purpose
housing subsidy programs) the questions of economic feasibil-
ity and default rates were not as important as they are now.
The Section 236 Interest Subsidy Program combined with FHA
insurance had effectively insulated MHFA and its sponsors
from the inherent risks of developing low income subsidized
housing. Sponsors, of course, never intended for any Section
1. Conversation with former MHFA policy intern, Bernard Lunch,
May 30, 1980.
-125-
236 developments to go into default; but if they did MHFA
could assign the mortgage over to HUD who would absorb
the losses.1
Housing subsidies under the Section 8 program do not
provide the same kind of protective insulation. Since 1976
not only are sponsors more concerned about the risks of
subsidized housing, but MHFA also has more responsibility
in the event of failure. It is quite unusual for a sponsor
to obtain FHA mortgage insurance under Section 8 as compared
to the Section 236 program 2--so instead of choosing fore-
closures as an option, most troubled projects owners must
strive for a workout solution which could involve additional
capital contributions.
The effect of this on the sponsor is obvious. They won't
4
propose a development that appears to be financially risky
and the effect on MHFA is quite similar. MHFA in its overall
attitude towards the financing of low-income housing has be-
come much more concerned with "financially sound
investment and management decisions."5 An effort has also
been made over the past few years at MHFA to develop not only
1. GAO Report, Section 236 Rental Housing: An Evaluation with
Lessons for the Future, ch. 3.
2. Long Term Costs of Section 8: Interim Findings.
3.
4. See Figure 3 above.
5. 1978 MHFA Annual Report from MHFA Chairman of the Board,
Edward Lashman.
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ways of making new commitments more financially secure, but
developing management techniques that will help insure the
viability of older mortgage commitments.1 These basically
entail efforts to anticipate problems and act quickly in
seeking rent increases or other measures to prevent minor
problems from "snowballing. ,2
In situations where a development does get into serious
financial difficulty, rather than foreclose on the property,
the MHFA legal department is more likely to respond, "Come,
let's talk, and bring your checkbook with $50,000."3 The
MHFA simply is not in the business of running developments
for the owners when things get tough; and to minimize the
possibility of today's mortgages becoming tomorrow's head-
aches, MHFA has committed itself to financing only low-
risk proposals. The extent to which this commitment has
contributed to the shift towards elderly housing is not
fully known, but evidence does exist which shows that the
success rate of housing proposals for mortgage funding de-
creases as the average household size increases (see Table 16,
Rows 1 and 2 below).
Another aspect of MHFA's decision-making environment
that has a direct bearing on the scarcity of Section 8 family
housing developments concerns the past and current system of
1. MHFA 1977, 1978, 1979 Annual Report.
2. For a more thorough study of how MHFA developed its system
of "workouts" see "Distressed Subsidized Housing: Effects,
Preventions, and Solutions," W.Q. Seeto, MCP Thesis, 1977, MIT.
3. Quoted from telephone conversation with Ed Hick of the
Boston GAO, June 30, 1980.
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Section 8 "set-asides." Section 8 statutory and administra-
tive "set-asides" are funds that must be reserved for use in
conjunction with other programsi and the MHFA happens to be
one agency that receives all of its Section 8 subsidy re-
sources directly from the central HUD office in Washington. 2
In addition, through the political process, sponsors
can obtain an allocation of Section 8 subsidy units directly
from Washington which lifts even more of the responsibility
from the MHFA to encourage a balance between elderly and
family housing production. MHFA policymakers know that their
allocation of Section 8 resources does not directly depend
on the distribution of mortgage financing that they approve,
so there is no incentive to go out of their way to advocate
family housing to the development community.
The situation therefore exists, in which unless the
allocation process is changed, it is unlikely that MHFA
will do anything to upset the status quo.
Income Mixing Criteria
In addition to tough management and workout policies
for troubled projects, MHFA changed its income-mixing
criteria several years ago; and the effect of this change
on the shift towards elderly housing must also be examined.
During the years of the Section 236 program (1968-73),
1. For example, almost 30 percent of Section 8's NC/SR con-
tract authority in FY 1978 was set aside for state agencies.
Kingsley and Both, RAND Corp., Pilot Urban Impact Analysis,
pg. 19.
2. Statement by Harriet Tee Taggart, CHPA meeting, 19 May 1980.
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MHFA proudly supported HUD's policy of limiting the number of
subsidized households in any development to 20 percent of the
total. The MHFA supported the goal of mixed income develop-
ments through their own policy of only financing developments
in which units were designated for 25 percent low income;
25 percent moderate income; and 50 percent market rate tenants.
When Section 8 rent subsidies replaced the Section 236
program, however, and sponsors began to appreciate the bene-
fits of seeking the highest possible guaranteed flow of income;
MHFA's preference for developments with limited subsidies be-
came meaningless. Most of the proposals that came in called
for full subsidies; so MHFA revised their policy of mixing
incomes, and the effect of this has been to reduce the de-
sireability and viability of family developments. MHFA's
revised policy states that, "In each housing development
25 percent of the residents must be persons or families of
low income." 2
The problem with stating the policy in this manner is
that it is misleading. When the problem the MHFA was trying
to address was the problem of having too many subsidized
tenants in their developments, it is misleading to respond
in this ambiguous manner. The statement gives the impression
that MHFA has to contend with many proposals which are lacking
in an acceptable number of subsidized tenants rather than
1. See Chapter 2.
2. MHFA 1977 Annual Report.
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the real problem of having high concentrations of subsidized
units. The revision of their policy effectively opened
the door to proposals consisting of 100 percent subsidized
units, and this has hurt the cause of family housing de-
velopments. Their desireability has been reduced, because
the very regulation which was intended to alleviate the
social and economic problems that are associated with con-
centrations of lower income families with children has been
abandoned. And, despite efforts to select tenants from the
upper range of Section 8 eligibility to offset those nearer
the bottom ; there is a great difference between this and
the former method of mixing incomes. What recent Section
8 family developments represent is precisely what former
policy-makers wanted to avoid.
Rehabilitation Guidelines
MHFA's rehab policies have also been modified in a way
that reduces their involvement with family housing. The MHFA
Board decided in 1974 to pursue the objective of becoming
more of a major catalyst for private investment and neigh-
borhood revitalization by confining their efforts to the
"gut" rehabilitation of large masonry structures in the
"best" locations2 . Almost by definition this meant that
1. Chuck McSweeney, interview, EOCD, Boston, 19 May 1980
2. MHFA, Report on Rehab, see Figures 17 ,18 and 19 below.
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Figure 17
EXAMPLE OF GUT REHAB OF LARGE MASONRY STRUCTURE IN THE "BEST" LOCATION
The Mercantile Wharf Building in Boston's Waterfront UrbanRenewal Area has won'many awards. The historic building builtin 1857 to serve the shipping trade was converted to mixedincome housing and retail shops by Peabody ConstructionCompany with a loan of $5,100,000 from MHFA.
Source: 1977 MHFA Annual Report
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Figure 18
EXAMPLE OF GUT REHAB OF LARGE MASONRY STRUCTURE IN THE "BEST" LOCATION
The Franklin Square House in Boston's South End has
been rehabilitated by State Street Development Company with
a $4,920,000 loan from MHFA. Constructed more than 100 years
ago as the St. James Hotel, the building now contains 193
modern apartments designed by Boston Architectural Team and
Archplan, Inc.
Source: 1977 MHFA Annual Report
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Figure 19
EXAMPLE OF GUT REHAB OF LARGE MASONRY STRUCTURE IN THE "BEST" LOCATION
The Bowdoin School, located in the Beacon Hill section
of Boston, was originally built in 1896. The structure was
used as a school until 1936 and for the next 40 years housed
the administrative offices of the Boston School Committee.
The Continental Wingate Company and its co-developer, the
Beacon Hill Civic Association, acquired the structure in 1976
and converted it into 35 units of housing designed by the
Boston Architectural Team, Inc. Construction was financed by
MHFA with a loan of $1,054,500.
Source: 1977 MHFA Annual Report
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rehab financing would be limited to elderly occupied mid
and high rise buildings such as converted hotels, factories,
schools, parking garages and large multi-unit residential
buildings'. Smaller wood-framed structures such as 3-6
family buildings needing only "cosmetic" rehab were no long-
er eligible for MHFA's long-term financing--yet these offer-
ed perhaps the most widespread opportunities to improve the
existing stock of family housing.
MHFA's rationale for limiting their rehab financing
was they believed that by making an initial investment in
large structures they could create an impact which would
encourage banks to provide smaller, less risky loans in the
neighborhood for "cosmetic" rehab. Whether this in fact
is occuring has not been determined and is a suitable topic
for further research; nevertheless, it must be acknowledged
that the adoption of their policy of becoming a catalyst
for private investment has had a direct although unintended
impact in reducing the amount of family housing rehab activ-
ity (see Figure 20 below).
One of the more common arguments among sponsors of
MHFA-financed rehab developments is that the reason why
so few rehab developments are built for families anymore
is because the local communities won't allow family develop-
ments of any kind2 . On the other hand, MHFA states in
1. Op.cit.
2. Bob Flood, interview, Dimeo Construction Co., 21 April 1980
-134-
their "Case for Rehab" that;
1) public support and interest in rehab and historic
preservation is high to preserve familiarity and
sentimentality;
2) that rehab changes liabilities into assets for cities
and towns by adding to the tax rolls;
3) and that rehab eliminates the threat to public safety
that unoccupied buildings present.
Distribution of Proposals and Relative Rates of Success
In Obtaining Financing
Since MHFA's statements suggest that local opposition
is less likely to be directed towards rehab than towards
new construction, the burden of explaining the decline in
family rehab activity seems to be shifted back to the lack
of sponsor interest rather than the result of local opposi-
tion. The truth of the matter, however, lies somewhere
in the middle of all three forces. For example, it is known
that sponsors under the Section 8 program actually propose
fewer family developments than under previous programs
(see Table 13 above and Table 16 below); but it is also
known that the MHFA's policies on rehab have restricted
family housing opportunities. And finally, it is a formid-
able threat to any housing sponsor that if delays in the
local permitting process postpone the scheduled rent-up;
the result is a potentially ruinous effect on the financial
feasibility of the development (see Chapter 4).
Evidence that the combined effect of these forces has
-135-
Figure 20
TOTAL MHFA FINANCED FAMILY HOUSING REHAB ACTIVITY
649
563 557
Number 365of 332
Units 401 332
249
53 7.
Year 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
Source: Compiled by the author from MHFA's Housing List.
reduced the rate at which family development proposals suc-
ceed in gaining mortgage funding is given in Table 16 below.
In Row 2, note that while 12 percent of the elderly proposals
received mortgage commitments, only 7 percent and 6 percent
of the respective small and large family proposals received
such commitments. Furthermore, the evidence shows that 36
percent of the elderly proposals were either rejected,
-136-
dropped, or withdrawn while 55 percent and 70 percent of
the respective small and large family proposals suffered
the same fate.
Table 16
ANALYSIS OF WHAT HAPPENED
TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF MHFA PROPOSALS, MAY 16, 1980
Elderly
(1.0-1.29)
Ave. BR*
Small Family
(1.3-1.89)
Ave. BR*
Large Family
(1.9 and over)
Ave. BR*
In Process
Committed
Rejected
Dropped
Withdrawn
Total
61 (52%)
14 (12%)
25 (22%) 36%12 (10O%)\
__5 4(f
117(100/4
26 (38%)
5 ( 7%)
17 (25 ) 55f14 (21f%)
6 .( 200f
-68(1000
4 (24%) 91 ( 45)
1 ( 6) 20( 10%)
2 (12%) 70f 44 ( 22%)
8 (46f) 34 ( 17%)
2(2 1( f
17(100 0 202 (100fo
* Ave. BR means the average bedroom size per unit over the
entire development.
Source: Compiled by the author from Kirk McClure, memo,
Proposals Year Ending May 16, 1980.
The reasons for the decline in the success rates as the
average bedrooms per unit increases are, of course, due to a
variety of forces; but for one to have a complete picture
of the causes behind the shift towards elderly developments,
it is necessary to acknowledge that MHFA's decision to drop
the requirement for mixing incomes and their more exclusive
rehab guidelines have contributed to the decline in family
housing developments.
Total
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MHFA's Financial Goals
The MHFA has been described as a business lending insti-
tution with a public purpose, and an examination of the pres-
sures and constraints under which the MHFA operates reveals
that indeed it is very businesslike in its operation. The
MHFA receives no direct allocation of State Tax revenues,
and according to its charter it was established as an inde-
pendent state agency loosely affiliated with the Department
of Community Affairs. The mortgage money that MHFA raises
arises from the sale of tax-exempt bonds in the private
market; and the resources that cover their staff and operat-
ing expenses are raised entirely through the fees and charges
that MHFA applicants are assessed. It is thus this free
market competitive environment that shapes the attitudes,
decisions, and goals that come out of MHFA's decision-making
Board of Directors.
For the most partthis Board consists of men and women
who are keenly aware of the "financial tightrope" that must
be walked in the process of developing subsidized housing;
and they are motivated to make decisions that protect the
security and stability of MHFA's portfolio.
How this Agency profile information translates into
action that favors the development of housing for the elderly
1. Interview with Bernard Lynch, May 19, 1980.
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is clear. MHFA must compete on the bond market for capital,
and the price they pay for that capital is directly related
to their bond rating and the perceptions of buyers as to
the viability and security of the assets which back-up the
bond note. If the MHFA's assets are perceived as risky in
the capital market, they will have to pay a higher percent-
age rate to acquire the capital. Three years ago MHFA's
Standard and Poor's Credit Rating was reduced from AA to A.
When John Eller, the new Executive Director, came to MHFA in
1977 the Agency soon afterwards put its mind to the task of
improving their bond rating and developing new management
and financial policies that would strengthen the security of
their portfolio.2 And since family projects have tradition-
ally been the ones with the greatest financial difficulties, 3
it is understandable that members of the Board would at least
view family developments with more caution--if, in fact,
they did not begin to develop a clear bias against such lending.
One of the principal rules in any business establishment
is that the owners must make daily economic decisions which in
1. MHFA, Annual Report 1979, "Report from the Chairman."
2. Ibid.
3. GAO Report, Evaluation of Alternatives For Financing, p. iv.
4. Anthony Yudis, "Despite Headaches, MHFA Still Producing,"
Boston Globe, 3 February 1980.
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tie long term result in either a successful or unsuccessful
business. MHFA's Advisory Committee--whose members re-
flect the King Administration's desire to maintain a
prudent image--thus naturally think in terms of how they
can make MHFA "successful." The most technical measure of
success then becomes their bond rating and the interest
rate that is largely determined by their rating.
In 1975 unprecedented problems in the nation's secur-
ities markets arose in which the financial weakness of New
York City and numerous other municipalities were the focus
of attention. These problems prevented the MHFA from
selling its notes and bonds and forced it to close its
doors to new development proposals.1 In response to this
situation the Massachusetts General Court enacted special
legislation, Chapter 598 of the Acts of 1975, which put
MHFA back in business by pledging the full faith and credit-
of the Commonwealth to a maximum of 500 million dollars.
Enactment of this special legislation, however, was not the
end of MHFA's difficulties. Their efforts to re-establish
themselves in the financial markets suffered a setback in
1977 when the Standard and Poor's Corporation dropped MHFA's
credit rating from AA to A.2 This followed the MHFA Study
Commission's 1976 Report which cited, "administrative
1. MHFA, 1978 Annual Report, p. 14.
2. Ibid.
-140-
matters that were of concern to the investment community."
John Eller, who served as Vice Chairman of the Com-
mission later became MHFA's Executive Director; and since
he took office in 1977 the Agency commenced aggressive
action to address those concerns. Eller's determination
to ensure the success of MHFA in the financial markets is
reflected in his statement:
Our access to the note and bond markets for addition-
al loan funds depends on our continuing success in
managing our existing investments. The Members and
I share the belief that the Agency's future depends
on our success in keeping our housing developments
alive and healthy. A troubled loan portfolio in-
creases our cost of borrowing money, a cost which
is passed on to the developers of future housing
in the form of higher interest rates for MHFA loans
and to tenants of this housing in the form of higher
rents. Accordingly we will take whatever steps are
necessary to insure the continuance of a healthy port-
folio.1
These steps have included such things as: 1) new reporting
requirements; 2) analytical procedures; and 3) an early
warning system for preventing troubles from developing.
In addition to these, to insure the long term viability
of MHFA's loan portfolio, the Agency's operations are carried
out, "to make sure only strong development teams, desire-
2
able sites, and sound proposals are selected for financing
The full impact of the above steps and MHFA's commitment to
success, on the decline in family housing production,
1. MHFA, 1978 Annual Report, pg. 9
2. Ibid. pg. 15
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suggests that MHFA's Board of Directors at least perceives
family developments as a potential threat to their vital
interests in the financial markets is quite clear.
What has been observed then as something of a reward
to MHFA--following the implementation of their 1977-1978
commitments to low-risk investment and decision-making
policies-- has been the upgrading of their Standard and Poor's
Corporation credit rating from A to A+ and the upgrading
of their non-guaranteed bond anticipation notes from MIG-2
to MIG-1. Given the incentive that these rewards pro-
duce to continue doing more of the same; and given the pos-
sibility that Section 8 funds will be reduced;2 one wonders
what the future holds for family developments. It is un-
fortunate to think that family housing sponsors could have
an even more difficult task gaining mortgage funds, yet
indications seem to suggest this is a very real possibility
(see Table 10 above).
In the absence of aggressive policies and adequate
funding, it may be that the future will find MHFA financed
housing, as we know it, will be a thing of the past.
1. MHFA 1979 Annual Report, "Letter from the Chairman"
2. "By a margin of one vote Section 8 funding narrowly
survived in a battle in Congress in May 19080," Harriet
Tee Taggart, MAPC, quoted from a CHPA Conference on
Housing, Boston, 12 June 1980.
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CONCLUSIONS
The role that MHFA plays in the process of developing
subsidized housing is a very significant one; and without
their mortgage financing a great many subsidized developments
would not have materialized. It is, therefore, essential to
understand that the MHFA always holds the last card in mak-
ing or breaking a proposal. Nevertheless, in all fairness
to the MHFA, whether a proposal is ultimately successful or
not is often a function of things that are outside the control
of the Agency. MHFA does not arbitrarily accept or reject
proposals based solely on whether they are for the elderly or
families. On the other hand, 1) it is more difficult (but
still quite possible) to develop family developments, and
2) when a sponsor of an elderly housing development obtains
an allocation of Section 8 subsidies from Washington, it is
hard for MHFA to resist providing the mortgage financing.
What makes a proposal attractive to sponsors and most
feasible in the long run is the impact of FMRs on cash flow
and financing; the process of equity syndication; the pros-
spects for long term capital gains; the extent to which the
BSPRA reduces the actual cash equity and whether local op-
position is likely to seriously jeopardize completion.
If there are no problems in these areas, and in the
words of John Eller, "only strong development teams, desire-
able sites and sound proposals..." remain and seek financing;
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then MHFA really should not care whether it is elderly or
family housing. For this reason, the impact of MHFA's pol-
icies and decision-making environment on the shift to elderly
housing is secondary to the impact of FMRs, feasibility,
syndication, the BSPRA, local opposition, and that intangible
element of the national and state political process.
The effect of MHFA's policies on rehab to finance only
large masonry structures in the best locations does contri-
bute, however, to the shift in the type of proposals "that
come in the door." Sponsors of proposals for rehab are almost
entirely limited to elderly tenants because of the elevator
clause; and unless smaller wood framed structures are made
eligible for MHFA's long term financing, it is likely that
rehab will continue to be synonymous with elderly housing.
Likewise, when MHFA dropped their income mixing criteria,
a subtle but very damaging blow was dealt to the cause of
family housing. Their desireability has been reduced because
the very regulation which was intended to alleviate the social
problems that are associated with concentration of lower in-
come families has been abandoned. And despite efforts to
select tenants from the upper range of Section 8 eligibility
to offset those nearer the bottom; there is a great difference
between this and the former method of mixing incomes. What
recent Section 8 family developments represent is precisely
what former policy-makers wanted to avoid.
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Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations
The purpose of this thesis was to perform an analysis of
the economic and the legislative forces which favor the de-
velopment of elderly housing; and the results of this analysis
provide insights and a significant quantitative basis for
ranking the impact of various factors. At the same time, it
is important to suggest policy recommendations and appropriate
incentives to improve MHFA and HUD's ability to meet the
housing needs of both family and elderly households.
Of greatest impact is the effect the FMR structure has
on replacement costs and feasibility. Without adequate cash
flow from the FMR's, it is a moot question to compare the
effect of other forces. Everything--from the perceptions
of people about the management and maintenance of a develop-
ment--to the sale of tax shelters to passive investors--is
predicated on the impact of the FMR's on feasibility and fi-
nancing. Within Massachusetts, the FMR rents enable all
housing developers (and especially developers of elevated
building types) in the FMR areas of Boston, Salem, and Lowell
to leverage significantly higher amounts of mortgage finan-
cing than sponsors in other areas. This has a great deal to
do with why the overwhelming bulk of sponsor interest, MHFA
financing, and construction activity occurs in these areas.
Thus a great need exists for HUD to review the differences
between the FMR's in all areas in an attempt to equalize the
amounts of mortgage financing that can be leveraged.
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Such a process would involve a careful statistical
analysis of the actual differences in the costs of materials,
labor, and professional services etc. as a measure of how
FMRs should differ--rather than the simplistic notion of
"market comparables" which is open to very subjective inter-
pretation.
It is unlikely that HUD field office personnel have
the time to undertake such an effort; but until the impact
of FMRs on financing is (continued next page)
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equalized it is unrealistic to expect major changes in the
role and ranking of the other forces which affect the dist-
ribution between elderly and family housing developments.
Factors such as the lack of sponsor interest in proposing
family developments will continue, as will the lower success
rate of family developments in obtaining mortgage financing
through MHFA. Likewise, local opposition to family devel-
opments is unlikely to change until a significant number
of existing family developments begin to demonstrate some
financial/fiscal strength above their present levels.
This is, of course, dependent on providing family develop-
ments with adequate operating and capital budgets through
higher FMRs.
Among these forces, however, the impact of the equity
syndication process must be ranked as the second most im-
portant variable in favoring the shift to elderly housing.
Since Congress, under the Section 8 program, shifted vir-
tually all of the risk and the responsibility for the suc-
cess of subsidized housing onto the private sponsors and
investors; a direct relationship exists between the finan-
cial security of a development and the sponsor's realiza-
tion of his anticipated equity syndication proceeds. It
is a relationship that encourages sponsors to prgefer the
development of elderly housing; but-it should not be used
to rule out the feasibility of family housing.
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Despite syndication proceeds being approximately one
third less, sponsors of family housing developments can also
earn large syndication proceeds. Thus it is an interesting
phenomena that so few family developments are built. The
fact that there really is money to be made through syndica-
tion, and that the Section 8 subsidy is flexible to better
compensate sponsors who face rising operating costs--both
suggest that forces outside the legislative and economic
framework (i.e. forces in the state and federal political
process) have a significant impact on the development of
elderly and family subsidized units.
Major differences in the minds of lawmakers and offic-
ials exist between the merits of helping needy elderly cit-
izens and needy younger households with children. For the
most part these differences are the result of the fact that
lawmakers and officials can more easily identify and sym-
pathize with the plight of poorer elderly persons who are
seen as having worked hard and had productive lives but are
just now' caught in the dilemma of living on a fixed income
amidst the ravages of inflation. Needy younger households
are not seen in this light. For them, the plight of poverty
is seen as the result of their own shortcomings and the
failure to "make it" in the land of opportunity.
Such perceptions run deep, and the kind of policy
changes that are naeded to eliminate the effects of such
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bias, unfortunately must come from within the very same
political institutions and processes that created the former.
Furthermore, there is a political reward structure for
those who work in the process of funding and developing
elderly housing which those of family housing do not re-
ceive. Votes, power and public recognition belong to those
who labor for the causes of elderly services, housing
and benefits; while frustration, contempt and often times
failure are the wages of those who support housing and
public benefits for the young and middle aged poor.
Within this constraint, however, it is possible to
suggest some changes which would improve both MHFA's and
HUD's ability to meet the housing needs of both family and
elderly households. The basis for one of these suggestions
takes into consideration the importance of good siting,
long term ownership and including various amenities to
enhance the realization of capital gains.
Sponsors of elderly housing have found themselves en-
hanced with these circumstances and are therefore encouraged
to exclusively focus on elderly housing.
One e,:perienced sponsor expressed it well when he said,
"Developers and investors are building these Section 8
projects to be viable for sale once the depreciation and
tax benefits wear out, and we feel that the amenities are
very important for the long term basis." Family housing is
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less likely to involve these amenitites and the long term
capital gains which follow; so this contributes to the lack
of sponsor interest.
Depending on the political philosophy one has in these
matters, the solution to equalizing the impact of elderly
developments generally being able to realize larger long
term capital gains can take one of two directions. Either
deny the sponsors of elderly housing the right to build
aesthetics and amenities into elderly housing, or enable the
sponsors of family housing to do the same by providing higher
FMRs and property standards. Unfortunately it is not a black
and white issue, but since we are dealing with public money
and the objective is to alleviate housing needs, it seems to
be a much more responsible position to curtail some of the
expenditures that go into elderly housing developments. When
only a small percentage of the eligible population is being
served by the Section SR/NC program, it does seem irrespons-
ible to overindulge the priviledged few who benefit. One GAO
analyst described the Section 8 SC/NC program as "conferring
knighthood" on its recipients.
Another suggestion to HUD and Congress would be to study
the accelerated depreciation tax provisions which the subsi-
dized housing industry uses to realize most of their profits
in the development process. The alleged reason for these
provisions is to entice investors with private capital to
-150-
to invest in subsidized housing. It is claimed that by giving
the developer a "break" through quicker write-offs of real
property and improvements, somehow these "breaks" translate
into lower rents which benefit the tenants, and a greater
volume of subsidized housing production.
Both of these assumptions are weak. For one, the ac-
celerated depreciation tax benefits benefit the developer
primarily, and the renter secondarily, if at all. There is
no relationship between what the tenant pays in rent and the
rate of depreciation which a sponsor is allowed to take. The
rent ceilings are pre-determined by HUD based on "market
comparables," and the tenant'ssb-are is a function of each
individual tenant's income (25 percent). HUD pays the dif-
ference between what the tenants can afford and the agreed
upon rents, and the depreciation rates are not even relevant
at this point.
Secondly, the accelerated depreciation benefits are not
even related to the amount of private cash equity which the
sponsors are required to invest. Private cash equity is a
function of the established formula of the 10 percent BSPRA,
which as an "allowance," (one analyst has referred to it as
"funnymoney") functions to reduce actual cash equity as low
as one percent of the actual development costs. Therefore,
the argument that accelerated depreciation benefits are nec-
essary to induce private investments in subsidized housing
should be reviewed in light of how little cash equity the
private sponsors of Section 8 developments actually invest.
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As demonstrated in this thesis, since it is generally
easier to find oneself enhanced with more favorable depreci-
ation benefits in the process of developing elderly housing
rather than family housing; some efforts should be made to
match accelerated depreciation benefits more with the type
of developments which would and could be occupied by family
households. As things are now, not only is there little risk
associated with elderly developments, great political rewards,
and long term investment opportunities; but the sponsors of
elderly developments tend to find themselves in a position of
being able to make greater profits through the sale of tax
shelters. If an effort were made to provide family housing
sponsors with an especially attractive depreciation rate un-
available to the sponsors of elderly housing, it is more likely
that family units would be built.
The next area of policy recommendations concerns some
very basic theories of whether the best approach to meeting
housing needs is through programs that stimulate the supply
of subsidized units or through programs that increase the ef-
fective demand of eligible households in the private market.
The Section 8 SR/NC program is clearly a supply program. How-
ever, despite over 500,000 units being produced nationally,
only a small percentage have been helped and the cost of
housing all needy households in SR/NC is prohibitive.
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No single approach to the housing problem in adequate;
neither is one combination of housing programs right for all
times. Nevertheless, one recommendation the author wishes to
make is that more of an emphasis in the federal budgetary pro-
cess be placed on programs which integrate both supply and
demand theories into practice. The Section 8 Moderate Re-
habilitation Program and the Section 8 Existing Housing Program
are examples of this idea, and they do not involve the tre-
mendous loss of tax revenues which seem to be the very life-
blood of the SR/NC program. Why these programs can be
thought of in terms of both how they supply more subsidized
housing and increase the economic demand of needy households
is that both programs 1) function in a way that effectively
reclaims housing units which could disappear from the housing
stock and then maintain them properly in the future; and 2)
provide eligible households with the economic means to re-
main in the improved and well-maintained unit.
Section 8 NC/SR allocations on the other hand, should
be used more selectively to include the supply of both family
and elderly units where it can be demonstrated 1) that mod-
erate rehabilitation and existing subsidies would not be as
cost effective and 2) that a mismatch exists between housing
needs and the supply of units of a particular size or struc-
ture type within a community.
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It should also be noted that the annual subsidy cost
per unit under the NC program is less than for SR; and the
NC program, unlike the SR program, is not inherently limited
to elderly occupants. Therefore, if more emphasis was placed
on NC with some appropriate tax incentives for family units,
it would be reasonable to expect a more balanced production
between elderly and family units. At the same time it could
reduce HUD's long term subsidy costs.
The question of whether we even need more family housing
production in itself is also interesting. With birth rates
leveling off at a relatively low rate after the historical
decline since 1960, and with the likelihood of fewer and fewer
large families, policy-makers should begin to think in terms
of how they can meet the rental housing needs of single
parent households with fewer children and how to produce
more medium-sized units.
According to Frieden and Solomon, an abundant supply
of large older housing units exist due to the decline in
the number of large families, and the adequate production of
such units prior to 1960. On the contrary, production of
medium-sized units did not keep up with the demand even prior
to 1960; and because of inflation, higher interest costs,
and the skyrocketing demand for medium-sized family units,
policy-makers should immediately address this shortage.
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How this might change the utilization of the Section 8
program is clear. The production of elderly housing units
under SR/NC should be curtailed at least until the crisis in
unmet family housing needs is alleviated. This should not
be viewed as a setback to the supporters of elderly housing
and services, but rather it should be viewed as a return to a
more equitable and balanced production of elderly and family
units.
The last area of policy recommendations concerns the
operation of MHFA. The operation of MHFA and their specific
policies on new construction and rehab financing also fac-
tor into the shift towards elderly housing. One of the
principal rules in any business establishment is that the
owners must make daily economic decision which in the long
term result in either a successful or unsuccessful business.
MHFA's board of directors thus naturally think in terms of
how they can make MHFA "successful." The most technical
measure of success is their bond rating and the interest
rate that is largely determined by this rating. The Agency
and its management are therefore committed to "make sure
only strcngdevelopment teams, desireable sites, and sound
proposals are selected for financing." But in reality,
MHFA's policies on rehab to finance only large masonry struc-
tures (typically limited to elderly occupants) in the best
locations imposes a tremendous limitation on the type of
proposals "that come in the door." So, to alleviate the
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imbalance between the number of elderly and family propos-
als, MHFA should restructure its rehab policies to provide
sponsors with the opportunity to obtain long term low,
interest financing for smaller wood framed structures in
which family tenants could live. If large elevated masonry
structures continue to receive the bulk of MHFA financing
committments, and low rise wood framed structures remain
ineligible, rehab will continue to be synonomous with
elderly housing. Thus the MHFA will have done nothing
(relative to the forces that are within their control) to
reverse the situation in which they have failed to fulfill
their legislative mandate "to provide safe and standard
housing which families and the elderly can afford."
Another policy recommendation for MHFA concerns their
stated "income mixing criteria," and a suggestion that it
be reinstated as soon as possible. Prior to the Section 8
program it was common for MHFA financed developments to con-
sist of 25% low income; 25% moderate income and 50% market
rate tenants. The purpose of this was both to deconcentrate
the pockets of low income neighborhoods and to encourage
economic integration. -
Both state and federal policymakers supported these
goals through a variety of housing programs; but with the
passage of the Section 8 program and subsequent amendments,
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sponsors and officials in the development community oab-
served the erosion of income mixing criteria.
This erosion, by incrementally increasing the subsidy
limits for elderly developments up to 100%, has led to the
current situation in which over 90% of all proposals come
in looking for a subsidy in every unit. The result has been
a very subtle but damaging blow to the cause of family
housing. Their desireability has been reduced, because
the very regulation which was intended to alleviate the
social problems that are associated with concentrations of
lower income families has been abandoned. Thus, what recent
Section 8 family developments represent is precisely what
former policymakers wanted to avoid.
Finally, the Section 8 regulations which require tenants
to pay 25 percent of their gross income for housing costs
is another factor which has a subtle but pervasive impact
on the shift towards elderly housing. For many eligible
low and moderate income tenants living in substandard housing,
the process of setting their rents at 25% of their income
would represent a net increase in their total housing costs.
This is especially true of those eligible households at the
upper limits of income eligibliity. As a result, many income
eligible tenants are not interested in Section 8 participa-
tion, and in fact neither are sponsors eager to manage units
in which the tenant's share of the contract rent approaches
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the maximum. Often families can find non-subsidized housing
at less cost than Section 8 and in fact prefer such arrange-
ments to keep their total housing costs as low as possible.
The net result is that Section 8 developments have
become stratified with the "poorest of the poor" whose
share of the rent is lower than what they could find else-
where; and since the cost and risk of managing and main=
taining a unit in which a poor elderly tenant lives is
known to be less than for family households, sponsors and
the MHFA prefer the elderly.
To intervene in this situation, in addition to the
previously mentioned policy recommendation of reinstating
income mixing criteria, federal and state policymakers should
consider a strategy along the lines of a housing allowance
or voucher system. The benefit of this alternative is that,
much like the Existing housing program and the Moderate
rehabilitation program; both housing supply and demand theor-
ies could be satisfied. On one hand the program would in-
crease the household's effective market demand and on the
other it would allow landlords to obtain rent increases
which are often necessary to prevent existing housing from
becoming abandoned.
A housing allowance would also allow more eligible
households to participate within current funding limits,
and poorer households would not necessarily have to move
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from their current residences to qualify. Both of these
cost-saving measures are often overlooked by the proponents
of new construction and substantial rehab and should be
given considerably more weight in the formulation of future
housing programs.
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APPENDIX 1
Note on the Costs of Increasing the Percentage of Elderly
Within the Community, i.e. Importing Elderly People, pg. 94
According to Ed Hick of the Boston area General
Accounting Office, in Hempstead, New York, "the community
decided to go all out for elderly projects to increase
their tax base without the school expense and really made
a mess of local businesses. They put places like Corvettes,
fast-food franchises, and convenience stores out of busi-
ness and hurt the new shopping center too. In addition,
they found that they had to open nurses' training schools
at public expense, enlarge the local hospital, and support
it. So you see, the imbalance can swing both ways."
The caveat (to'the issue of local governments opposing
family housing on the grounds that it is perceived to rep-
resent a net fiscal drain on the budget) is that the real
impact depends upon the previous residential locations
of the project's occupants. If all move from within the
same jurisdiction, there should be little or no net change
in the demand for services by that jurisdiction. The
spatial allocation of services might have to be adjusted,
and depending on how adjustments are handled, some net ef-
ficiencies might result. Since it is suspected that most
movement generated by Section 8 and past subsidy programs
has been intrajurisdictional ; opposition to family hous-
ing and the preference for elderly housing solely on their
perceived fiscal impacts is, therefore, open to question.
1. Kingsley and Both, Pilot Urban Impact Analysis, pg. 58
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APPENDIX 2
Note on Proposed Changes in Tax Legislation
The tax reform proposals submitted by President
Carter in conjunction with the 1979 budget included a pro-
posal to reduce the favorable depreciation treatment on new
market-rate multi-family rental housing to a 150 percent
declining balance rate through 1982, and to a straight line
rate thereafter. In contrast, depreciation deductions on
new lower-income rental housing projects could be claimed
at the 200 percent declining balance rate through 1982,
but would be limited to a 150 percent declining balance
rate after that'.
Stricter rules that would make it difficult for real
estate investors to increase their depreciation deductions
by claiming artificially short building lives for tax
purposes have also been proposed. If enacted, these changes
would reduce the potential profitability of rental housing
as an investment. Nevertheless, housing would remain rela-
tively more attractive than non-residential investments
until 1983; and from a tax standpoint, federally subsidized
low-income housing would continue to be relatively more
attractive than other residential investments 2
1. Arthur Solomon, '"ederal Housing Policy: Background PaDer
on Recurring Policv Issues,"pg. 71
2. ibid. pg. 72.
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